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Silicon Valley was built on the ability of individuals to use their knowledge and
expertise to seek better employment opportunities, an idea recognized by both
California law and public policy. . . . We respect trade secrets, and will defend
ourselves against these claims.1
[E]very Man has a Property in his own Person. . . . The Labour of his Body, and
the Work of his Hands, we may say, are properly his.2
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INTRODUCTION
The skills, relationships, and knowledge bound up in a firm’s employees
have long been recognized as a source of important competitive advan-
tage.3 Yet as companies increasingly rely on the strength of their human
capital—in other words, their employees—for generating revenue, the
potential economic harm inflicted by departing employees who move to a
competitor is increasingly severe. As a result, firms are keen to use all
available legal tools to restrict the post-employment mobility of their valu-
able employees, even as public policy may be shifting toward prioritizing
employee mobility.4 This tension in the modern workplace also has busi-
ness ethics implications as employers, employees, and competitors navi-
gate these conflicting economic incentives and policy goals.
This tension between an employee’s mobility and the interests of the
employer is not a new development. Notably, the most used and discussed
post-termination employee restrictive covenant is the covenant not to
compete. These agreements have been contentious in the common law for
centuries, with the earliest reported English cases dating back to the
fifteenth century.5 Even in the early cases, the courts developed a rule of
reason to evaluate these restrictions and “balanc[e] the social utility of
certain types of restraints against their possible undesirable effects upon
the covenantor and the public.”6 The reasonableness test these early courts
applied to covenants not to compete is still basically the same today and has
received a great deal of attention by scholars, but there are two more
recently developed, less understood employee-mobility restrictions that we
also examine in this article, the doctrine of inevitable disclosure and
garden leave. To begin to address this research gap, we take a legal analysis
3See, e.g., Sharon F. Matusik & Charles W.L. Hill, The Utilization of Contingent Work, Knowledge
Creation, and Competitive Advantage, 23 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 680 (1998) (discussing the relation-
ship between flexible employer–employee relationships and the accumulation of knowledge
for use in securing competitive advantage).
4See Michael J. Garrison & John T. Wendt, The Evolving Law of Employee Noncompete Agreements:
Recent Trends and an Alternative Policy Approach, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 107, 164 (2008) (finding that
“recent developments signal a shift to a strict approach to [evaluating] restrictive covenants
founded on a dominant policy concern for protection of employee mobility”).
5Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625, 631 (1960)
(discussing the significance of the early English cases, including the Dyer’s Case in 1414).
6Id. at 630 (describing the opinion in Mitchel v. Reynolds, (1711) 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B.)).
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and applied ethics approach to evaluate covenants not to compete and
then inevitable disclosure and garden leave. This allows us to take an
in-depth, comparative look at these restrictions and to highlight the asso-
ciated problems and benefits of each in order, ultimately, to make recom-
mendations on whether the newer concepts provide desirable alternatives
to covenants not to compete. In general, we find that inevitable disclosure
is highly problematic; however, garden leave, while not a perfect solution,
has the potential compared to the other options to be a useful tool for
managers as they seek to pursue business goals related to employee mobil-
ity and to do so in an ethically sound manner.
The continued importance of this human capital management reality
and how new restrictions are entering the debate over employee freedom
of job mobility are emphasized by recent news reports about Bank of
America, simultaneously the United States’ largest lender and deposit
holder. The financial press reported that, in an apparent response to the
loss of “a financial adviser with $5.9 billion in client assets to a rival,” some
high-value employees of the bank’s U.S. Trust unit received notice that
they would be subject to a new term of employment.7 In advance of their
usual bonus payments, the remaining U.S. Trust financial advisers were
told they must sign a new “garden leave” provision to keep their jobs.8 The
additional contract clauses changed the previous terms such that “[a]dvis-
ers who previously could leave after two weeks notice now must remain for
60 days and are forbidden from soliciting clients for a total of eight
months.”9 One observer, the president of an executive search firm,
assessed the employer’s actions this way: “They’re sending the message,
‘Make no mistake, you will incur our wrath, this is not a place you want to
leave.’”10 She then cautioned that “[i]t’s very rare that a company would
have garden-leave provisions for producers, and I think this could backfire
if people view it as draconian.”11 The efforts were reportedly taken by the
wealth management unit “to stem defections as rivals jockey to manage
7Hugh Son, BofA Forces ‘Garden Leave’ on Brokers After Defection, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Feb.
18, 2011, 1:29 PM EST), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-02-18/bofa-forces-garden-
leave-on-brokers-after-defection.html.
8Id.
9Id.
10Id. (quoting Mindy Diamond, president of Diamond Consultants LLC).
11Id.
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money for high-net-worth individuals.”12 When the financial stakes are
high, the lines of conflict between the interests of employers and their
valuable employees become clearly defined.
In contrast to an employer’s fears of employee mobility that may
transfer valuable knowledge to competitors, the ease of changing jobs in
the United States can be an important way for an individual to advance her
career and increase her earnings.13 In difficult economic times, however, a
prospective employee’s leverage to negotiate the terms of employment
may be diminished, while an employer’s negotiation position is corre-
spondingly strengthened.14 Though both parties are likely concerned with
terms of employment that are usually negotiated, such as salary and
benefits, restrictions on the employee’s post-employment career mobility
remain an underappreciated issue. In exchange for even an entry-level
job, an enthusiastic and eager-to-please new employee may casually agree
to a restrictive covenant that will have significant, unforeseen, and poten-
tially damaging career consequences in the future.
When it comes to restrictions on an employee’s post-employment
freedom to take any new job she may choose, employers’ and employees’
interests are often in sharp conflict. In these common instances the courts,
sometimes with assistance from legislatures, must balance concerns of
fairness, choice of vocation, freedom of contract, economic efficiency, the
public interest, knowledge transfer, and business realities. While courts
routinely adjudicate these disputes over employee mobility, they seldom, if
ever, discuss the ethical justifications for choosing one outcome over
another. There are obviously trade-offs inherent in any contract between
an employer and an employee in which the parties bargain over the work
required and the compensation provided for that work. Yet, does the law
adequately protect employee freedoms while allowing an employer to
12Id.
13See Catherine Rampell, Many with New College Degree Find the Job Market Humbling, N.Y.
TIMES, May 18, 2011, at A1 (discussing the current difficult job market for college graduates
and the importance of moving into a better job). One economist observed, “If you don’t move
within five years of graduating, for some reason you get stuck where you are. That’s just an
empirical finding.” Id. (quoting Till von Wachter, an economist at Columbia University).
14See, e.g., Kate O’Neill, Should I Stay or Should I Go?—Covenants Not to Compete in a Down
Economy: A Proposal for Better Advocacy and Better Judicial Opinions, 6 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 83
(2010) (advocating for courts to limit noncompete enforcement to employees with significant
bargaining power to negotiate the agreement at the outset of the employment relationship).
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protect its hard-earned competitive advantage? Does the law favor one
party over another in this instance? What is best from a societal stand-
point? Should the law favor one of the parties? If so, what are the under-
lying principles to support that potential imbalance? Moreover, what are
the ethical implications of an employer’s decision to restrict the future
employment choices of an employee? Also, which of the available options
and justifications for restricting an employee’s freedom of professional
movement have the most ethical and practical grounding—and why?
While these questions persist, to date there has been little guidance
for courts and policy makers on what ethical considerations surround
post-employment legal restrictions upon employee mobility. Business law
and employment law scholars, who in the last decade or so have focused on
the fast-evolving nature of the employment relationship, provide an initial,
broad view of why these legal tools and their attendant moral implications
are increasingly important for employers. Some of the consistent themes
inherent in this body of research are the importance of technology and
knowledge management for business advantage, alongside a trend toward
individualized contractual relations between employees and employers in
a changing American employment market. For instance, Katherine V.W.
Stone has explored the “new psychological contract” between employers
and employees, which is marked by disputes over human capital develop-
ment and ownership as opposed to the historical model of job security and
promotions with a single firm.15 Kenneth Dau-Schmidt has examined the
role of technology16 and labor contracting17 in the modern workplace.
Terry Morehead Dworkin and Elletta Sangrey Callahan have detailed the
use of nondisclosure agreements and measured their effectiveness against
other attempts to restrict information, including covenants not to com-
pete.18 Joan T.A. Gabel and Nancy R. Mansfield have looked at the legal
implications of the “cyberspace workplace” where workers often work
15Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications for the Changing Workplace
for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519 (2001).
16Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Employment in the New Age of Trade and Technology: Implications for
Labor and Employment Law, 76 IND. L.J. 1, 1 (2001).
17Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt & Timothy A. Haley, Governance of the Workplace: The Contemporary
Regime of Individual Contract, 28 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 313, 313–14 (2003).
18Terry Morehead Dworkin & Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Buying Silence, 36 AM. BUS. L.J. 151,
169–71 (1998).
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remotely through the use of new technologies.19 Michael Garrison and
John Wendt also have specifically explored the policy implications and
emerging trends in restrictions on employee mobility.20
Among the assumptions that underlie the current approach to this
evolving workplace are that employees are mobile and that the old para-
digm of long-term and even lifetime employment with one employer are
now things of the past.21 A fast-moving and competitive labor marketplace
has replaced the old employer–employee arrangement. This new dynamic
has been called a “high-velocity labor market,” particularly in the high-
tech sector.22 In this context of rapid job hopping there also has been
criticism of legal rules that impede the ease of mobility and the speed of
this labor market.23 Moreover, the impending new Restatement of Employ-
ment Law provides further evidence that both legal scholars and practitio-
ners are currently debating the roots and underlying values of the U.S.
employment laws, including legal rules that directly implicate employee
mobility.24
This article seeks to add a new dimension to this debate by examining
the business law and business ethics aspects of three modern mechanisms
19Joan T.A. Gabel & Nancy R. Mansfield, The Information Revolution and Its Impact on the
Employment Relationship: An Analysis of the Cyberspace Workplace, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 301, 323 (2003)
(providing a detailed view of the legal implications for employment relationships in a
technology-driven work environment).
20Garrison & Wendt, supra note 4.
21See, e.g., Stone, supra note 15, at 539–41.
22ALAN HYDE, WORKING IN SILICON VALLEY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF A HIGH-VELOCITY
LABOR MARKET (2003).
23Alan Hyde, Should Noncompetes Be Enforced?: New Empirical Evidence Reveals the Economic
Harm of Non-compete Covenants, REGULATION, Winter 2010, at 6 (adapted from a chapter in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW (Michael
Wachter & Cynthia Estlund eds., forthcoming 2011)).
24See, e.g., Rachel Arnow-Richman, Response to the Working Group on Chapter 2 of the Proposed
Restatement of Employment Law: Putting the Restatement in Its Place, 13 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J.
143, 146 (2009) (“What we have seen is a widely documented trend toward short term
employment, the rise of contingent labor, the rollback of employer sponsored health plans
and benefits, a reversion to external labor market practices, and, more recently, the most
significant economic downturn since the Great Depression.” (citations omitted)); Matthew W.
Finkin, Second Thoughts on a Restatement of Employment Law, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 279
(2005) (critiquing the underlying assumptions of the need for a Restatement of Employment
Law).
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for restricting an employee’s post-employment mobility either to a com-
petitor or to the employee’s own newly formed competing enterprise. Part
I presents the background and discusses the motivations and incentives for
employers to restrict their former employees’ professional mobility. Next,
Part II discusses the law and the associated public policy concerns of three
legal mechanisms for restricting post-employment mobility: covenants not
to compete, the doctrine of inevitable disclosure, and garden leave. Part
III provides a business ethics critique of these mechanisms from the rights,
utilitarian, and fairness perspectives. Part IV then presents recommenda-
tions for policy makers related to balancing the competing interests
involved in restricting employee mobility, as well as suggestions for addi-
tional research.
I. BACKGROUND ON EMPLOYEE MOBILITY
RESTRICTIONS
Employment mobility is generally supported by public policy and favored
by employees.25 Nevertheless, employers have a valid interest in managing
their current and former employees’ ability to be professionally mobile.
This section considers these sometimes conflicting interests, together with
some of the overarching policy issues arising from the legal constraints on
employee mobility.
In general, the economic mobility of employees ensures their per-
sonal freedom to pursue a livelihood of their choice, in the position where
their capabilities will be most productive and where they are most likely to
achieve success.26 Society benefits from maximized productivity, as well
as the dissemination of skills and knowledge, which can contribute to
25See generally Garrison & Wendt, supra note 4, at 112 (finding an “emerging trend in the law
of employee noncompete agreements” indicating “that courts are generally more inclined to
invalidate employee noncompete agreements than under the modern approach and that the
law of employee noncompete agreements is becoming more protective of the employee’s
interest in mobility”).
26See Wexler v. Greenberg, 160 A.2d 430, 433 (Pa. 1960) (the court aimed to “be particularly
mindful of any effect our decision in this case might have in disrupting this pattern of
employee mobility, both in view of possible restraints upon an individual in the pursuit of his
livelihood and the harm to the public in general in forestalling to any extent widespread
technological advances”).
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innovation.27 For instance, some professionals such as lawyers and (in some
jurisdictions) physicians serve a recognized public policy function, which
has resulted in a prohibition on noncompetition agreements for those
types of workers.28
In recent times, freedom of mobility has become increasingly more
important for employees as the new psychological employment contract
eschews notions of loyalty and commitment,29 thereby eliminating the
security of long-term employment, pay and promotions based on tenure,
and generous pensions for retirement.30 Instead, as employees shoulder
the risks of economic cycles, save for their own retirements, and are paid
only what globalized markets will bear, they must focus their efforts on
developing the worth of their own human capital in order to ensure the
marketability of their labor.31 Indeed, marketing their labor by switching
jobs seems to have a large impact on employees’ financial success. A recent
economic study found that, among college graduates, those making three
job changes at optimal points in their career gained wage increases
amounting to as much as thirty-two percent compared to a graduate
27Id.; see also infra Part III.B (discussing cost–benefit analysis).
28See generally Alina Klimkina, Note, Are Noncompete Contracts Between Physicians Bad Medicine?
Advocating in the Affirmative by Drawing a Public Policy Parallel to the Legal Profession, 98 KY. L.J.
131 (2009) (discussing the ban in all states on noncompetes for lawyers and arguing that
physician noncompetes should be similarly prohibited).
29See Timothy L. Fort, The First Man and the Company Man: The Common Good, Transcendence,
and Mediating Institutions, 36 AM. BUS. L.J. 391, 392 (1999) ( “Corporate downsizing has left the
loyalty of employees unrequited. Once, an employee’s loyalty and commitment to a company
provided a sense of identity and meaning—employees were ‘company men’ . . . [; however, i]t
is increasingly difficult for individuals to find a sense of long-term identity in corporate
America. Indeed, in light of this emphasis on self-reliance, the common good seems merely
a quaint, nostalgic phrase for today’s company man. Thus, the ‘company man’ has become
the ‘first man.’”).
30See Stone, supra note 15, at 572 (discussing how the old employment model arose under the
New Deal where “there evolved an employment system comprised of rising longevity-based
wages, employer-based health insurance, and employment linked retirement security”).
31Id. at 570 (“It becomes clear from an examination of the writings of prominent management
theorists that corporations are searching to find a way to make the shift away from long-term
career employment not only acceptable, but desirable. By promising employees the oppor-
tunity to develop their human capital, the new psychological contract tries to do this.
Employers promise employability and training so that, in return, employees will see them-
selves as entrepreneurs marketing their own human capital in a market place.”).
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making no job changes.32 Consequently, restricting employee mobility can
have the effect of depressing wage levels.33
To place this discussion in a contemporary context, we consider the
fast-paced modern business world in which a firm’s employees hold much
of the business knowledge and technological skills required to successfully
operate the firm. As high technology and knowledge usage has become
increasingly important, firms have come to rely on their employees (in
other words, human capital) for their competitive advantage. Firms need
to manage the risk of losing this advantage, particularly when those valu-
able employees depart to work for a competitor34 and even when that
competitor is located halfway around the world.35
A recent example from the technology sector drives this point home.
The Wall Street Journal reported how Google, Inc. unveiled its Google
Wallet and Google Offers concepts in advance of a summer 2011 product
launch.36 Like other Google ventures into the mobile device market with its
Android operating system, these technology products go beyond the com-
pany’s original core search engine and advertising business model. The
so-called digital wallet “will let consumers with Android smartphones pay
for goods and services or receive coupons and offers by waving the phone
in front of a special reader at the checkout counter.”37
Another story on the same page of the business section that day
reported that eBay and its PayPal division filed a lawsuit against Google in
a matter related to the very same mobile-payments business activities.38
32Rusty Tchernis, Measuring Human Capital and Its Effects on Wage Growth, 24 J. ECON. SURVS.
362, 378 (2010).
33Mark J. Garmaise, Ties That Truly Bind: Non-competition Agreements, Executive Compensation,
and Firm Investment, 27 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 376, 414 (2009) (“Our results show that non-
competition agreements can serve as an effective means for securing employee resources
within the boundary of the firm. Our findings also indicate, however, that the human capital
of the firm’s managers is changed by the presence of covenants not to compete.”).
34Id. at 382.
35See Marisa Pagnattaro, “The Google Challenge”: Enforcement of Noncompete and Trade Secret
Agreements for Employees Working in China, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 603 (2007) (examining, in part, the
complications of managing employee-possessed knowledge across international borders).
36Roger Cheng, Google Unveils Its Digital-Walled Plan, WALL ST. J., May 27, 2011, at B3.
37Id.
38Ian Sherr & Andrew Morse, Ebay Sues Google over Mobile-Payments System, WALL ST. J., May
27, 2011, at B3.
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Specifically, eBay claims “that Google poached two senior executives . . .
who then recruited other employees from eBay [and that] those employees
used PayPal trade secrets to develop Google digital commerce products.”39
The lawsuit alleges that one of the former executives “transferred digital
documents outlining PayPal’s mobile-payment and point-of-sales strategies
just days before leaving the company for Google. EBay says those docu-
ments were critical to its mobile-payments strategy.”40 In leaving eBay, the
executive took not only his personal inalienable human capital but he also
allegedly misappropriated trade secrets and shared them with a competi-
tor, breached his fiduciary duties, and violated an agreement not to solicit
fellow employees.41
This dispute illustrates a modern-day dilemma that worker mobility
raises for the employers, employees, competitors, and policy makers
involved. In a fast-moving business world where knowledge and the indi-
viduals who create and use that knowledge are key sources of competitive
advantage, the legal mechanisms available to employers have become
more important than ever.42 Indeed, because of their importance and their
impact on individual freedom of mobility, the underlying normative jus-
tifications for those legal mechanisms upon which courts and legislatures
rely are also of great importance. To establish the motivations and stakes
involved with issues of employee mobility, this part reviews why employers
have significant incentives to attempt to control when their workers end
the employment relationship and where they move afterwards.
As a strategic matter, employers will seek a sustainable competi-
tive advantage over their business rivals.43 In recent years business law
scholars have recognized the important role of law in achieving competitive
39Id.
40Id.
41See Complaint, PayPal, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. 111CV201863 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 26,
2011), 2011 WL 2098304 (providing a detailed description of the allegations).
42See Constance E. Bagley, What’s Law Got to Do With It?: Integrating Law and Strategy, 47 AM.
BUS. L.J. 587, 630–31 (2010) (using the example of the corporate lawyer’s role in anticipating
the inevitable disclosure of trade secrets as a way to manage the legal aspects of a potential
competitive advantage over rivals).
43For a leading description of sustainable competitive advantage in the management litera-
ture, see Jay Barney, Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage, 17 J. MGMT. 99 (1991)
(widely cited as the seminal work on the resource-based theory).
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advantage.44 The broad applicability of this concept is demonstrated by the
proliferation of scholarship in both the business law45 and management
literatures46 that discusses the role of law in creating competitive advan-
tage. To the extent that human capital is a source of sustainable competi-
tive advantage in its business model, a firm will compete in part by seeking
to exclude the human capital of its employees from use by competitors.47
In effect, a strategic employer may want to treat the human capital (i.e., the
employee) as a rivalrous and excludable private good. For instance, a firm
may develop a technological advantage in the form of a factory machine
that belongs exclusively to the firm. Those ownership rights mean the firm
can exclude others from using the machine. The technology in the
machine may be patentable, in which case the firm could gain a time-
limited monopoly to exclude others from utilizing it. In addition, the
unique and valuable technological knowledge and processes used to create
a product may qualify as a legally protected trade secret.
However, human beings are obviously not some sort of transferable,
technological commodity owned by firms—despite modern employees’
key role as a repository of valuable intellectual property.48 An undeniable
prohibition on slavery or involuntary servitude makes it clear that employ-
ees are free to leave a job, under at-will employment or under an employ-
44See, e.g., Bagley, supra note 42 (discussing the role of law in business strategy development);
David Orozco, Legal Knowledge as an Intellectual Property Management Resource, 47 AM. BUS. L.J.
687 (2010) (describing the role of legal and regulatory acumen in finding competitive
advantage in a firm’s intellectual property management).
45See, e.g., Bagley, supra note 42; Robert C. Bird, Pathways of Legal Strategy, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS.
& FIN. 1, 10 (2008) (identifying categories of legal strategy that can lead to competitive
advantage); Orozco, supra note 44.
46See, e.g., GEORGE SIEDEL & HELENA HAAPIO, PROACTIVE LAW FOR MANAGERS: A HIDDEN SOURCE OF
COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE (2011); Constance E. Bagley, Winning Legally: The Value of Legal
Astuteness, 33 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 378 (2008).
47See, e.g., Matusik & Hill, supra note 3, at 687 (“Contingent work may disseminate valuable
private knowledge into the external environment, leading to the decay of competencies and
a loss of competitive advantage. The departure of individuals causes a loss to the firm routines
and practices in which these individuals participated.” (citation omitted)).
48Cf. Joseph F. Phillips, Note, Inevitable Disclosure Through an Internet Lens: Is the Doctrine’s
Demise Truly Inevitable? 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 395, 402–03 (2003) (“In terms of trade secret
jurisprudence . . . the employee’s rights are of special importance. Preventing restrictions on
freedom of job choice is one of the most basic rights that the American laborer enjoys.” (citing
U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIII, § 1 (prohibiting involuntary servitude)) (emphasis added)).
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ment contract, and cannot be forced to work.49 While employed, the
individual owes a fiduciary duty of loyalty to the employer.50 This duty of
loyalty will provide the employer with some comfort that an employee will
not engage in activities like competition to the employer’s detriment (and
potential legal recourse if the duty is breached). Employers will, however,
seek to use other legal means to diminish the ability of their workers to
leave and engage in damaging competition.
An initial tactic for employers is to claim ownership of a piece of
knowledge in a way that it can be separated from the employee and, thus,
restricted from use by that employee without the employer’s permission.51
Examples of proprietary knowledge ownership held by an employer
would be patent rights or, perhaps less defined, rights in proprietary trade
secrets. Both patent protection, with all of its formal requirements and
federal approval, and trade secret law, which arises circumstantially, are
separate areas of law outside of the employer–employee relationship.
It also is true that knowledge is not bounded in the same way as other
economically exploitable assets; rather, as compared to other knowledge
resources, ideas are unique in that they lack boundaries.52 Because
49A classic case embodying the rule against granting the equitable relief of specific perfor-
mance for personal service contracts—but allowing an injunction against working for another
employer in breach of an employment contract—is Madison Square Garden Corp. v. Carnera, 52
F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1931), in which the court granted a boxing promoter an injunction against
a boxer whose intent to box for another employer violated the parties’ exclusive services
contract.
50See generally Benjamin Aaron & Matthew Finkin, The Law of Employee Loyalty in the United
States, 20 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y 321 (1999) (discussing the employee duty of loyalty). See also
Orly Lobel, Citizenship, Organizational Citizenship, and the Laws of Overlapping Obligations, 97
CALIF. L. REV. 433 (2009) (discussing the duty of loyalty in a new employment context of
shorter employment periods and the employee’s relationship to the corporation and society).
In addition, nonemployee stakeholders such as members of a corporation’s board of directors
also will have a duty of loyalty to the entity. See, e.g., Dana M. Muir & Cindy A. Schipani, The
Challenge of Company Stock Transactions for Directors’ Duties of Loyalty, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 437,
444–57 (2006) (discussing the duty of loyalty).
51See generally Norman D. Bishara & David Orozco, Using the Resource-Based Theory to Determine
Covenant Not to Compete Legitimacy, 87 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2012) (discussing the separation
of knowledge ownership rights between employers and employees).
52For instance, when describing the attributes of knowledge in a study of geographic mobility
of engineers, two management scholars observed:
Ideas, because they have no material content, should be the least spatially-bounded of all
economic activities. Being weightless, their transport is limited only by the quality and
availability of communication. Since ideas serve both as the inputs and outputs in their
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business-valuable knowledge can be easily diffused and may lose value as it
becomes dispersed, employers may try to restrict access to information
such as trade secrets, and they may be more comfortable with doing that by
contract instead of relying on intellectual property protections.53 In addi-
tion, employers will also make efforts to protect other proprietary infor-
mation that may not rise to the level of a protectable trade secret, such as
a client list.
Using contracts to achieve competitive advantage,54 employers may
utilize a variety of contractual tools to manage what, from their perspec-
tive, is undesirable knowledge diffusion. Short of directly impacting
employee mobility by contract, as discussed below in the context of cov-
enants not to compete and garden leave, employers may use contracts to
supplement the default legal framework for trade secret protection in their
jurisdiction. For example, employee-executed nondisclosure and confi-
dentiality agreements are contractual provisions that restrict the transfer
of information and are beyond the default rule of an employee’s duty of
loyalty.55 These agreements seek to stop knowledge flows to competitors;
however, they do not by themselves restrict an employee from engaging in
competition or necessarily address employee mobility. In addition, unlike
some contractual restrictions such as covenants not to compete, “[c]onfi-
dentiality agreements . . . are enforceable even in states in which anti-
competition clauses are prohibited.”56
own production, their location need be constrained neither by the happenstance of the
spatial distribution of raw materials, energy, and labor, nor by that of demand and
markets.
Paul Almeida & Bruce Kogut, Localization of Knowledge and the Mobility of Engineers in Regional
Networks, 45 MGMT. SCI. 905, 905 (1999).
53See Kristen Osenga, Information May Want to Be Free, but Information Products Do Not: Protecting
and Facilitating Transactions in Information Products, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2099, 2117 (2009)
(citing contract law as “an appealing alternative to traditional intellectual property protec-
tion” and adding that “[b]usinesses are comfortable and familiar with contracts, probably
even more so than intellectual property”).
54See, e.g., Larry A. DiMatteo, Strategic Contracting: Contract Law as a Source of Competitive
Advantage, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 724, 765 (2010).
55See Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 18, at 169–71.
56Id. at 156–57 (adding that “[c]oncerns regarding restraint of trade [as with covenants not to
compete] are much less directly implicated in this context; restrictions on access to informa-
tion, rather than employee movement, are involved”).
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This section has described employer motivations to restrict knowl-
edge transfer to competitors. The next part lays out three legal mecha-
nisms for restricting such knowledge transfer: the covenant not to
compete, the doctrine of inevitable disclosure, and garden leave. Each
legal restriction raises important ethical questions because these mecha-
nisms directly address an employee’s freedom of mobility after the employ-
ment relationship has ended.
II. LEGAL MECHANISMS FOR RESTRICTING
EMPLOYEE MOBILITY
In this part, we examine three illustrative legal mechanisms used by
employers to restrict the post-employment mobility, and thus freedom, of
their workers. In turn, we discuss each concept along with the relevant
legislation and case law that further explains how the mechanism is
applied in various jurisdictions. This descriptive discussion sets the stage
for Part III, where the business ethics and philosophical analysis of each
concept leads to conclusions about the best use, if any, of these legal tools.
A. Noncompetes
The most widely used contractual tool for restricting an employee’s post-
employment mobility is the covenant not to compete.57 The covenant not
to compete (also called a noncompetition agreement or simply a noncom-
pete) comes in two types. First, it may create restrictions on post-
employment competition with the employer if it is agreed to by a former
employee. Second, a former owner who has sold the goodwill of the
business may agree not to compete with the new owner. Non-employment-
related covenants that fall into this second category include restrictive
covenants that are often included in franchise agreements.58 In either the
57Quantifying the number of noncompetes in use—much less tracking the trend in noncom-
pete usage and disputes over time—is difficult because most are not publicly reported.
Nonetheless, scholars agree that noncompetes are increasingly being used in jurisdictions
where they are enforceable. See, e.g., Gillian Lester, Restrictive Covenants, Employee Training, and
the Limits of Transaction-Cost Analysis, 76 IND. L.J. 49, 49 (2001) (stating that noncompetes “are
an increasingly common feature of employment”).
58See, e.g., Michael R. Gray & Jason M. Murray, Covenants Not to Compete and Nonsignatories:
Enjoining Unfair Conspiracies, 25 FRANCHISE L.J. 107, 107 (2006) (“Most franchise agreements
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post-employment or sale of a business instance, the contract restricts, for a
specified time and scope, the otherwise legally permissible activities of the
individual. For our purposes, we discuss only the former employee situa-
tion because of our emphasis on the ethical implications of restricting
employee mobility; although other situations, such as with franchisees,
may still implicate an individual’s freedom of mobility and resulting ethical
issues.59
While noncompete enforcement is, on its face, an anticompetitive
tactic, courts will allow enforcement when the restrictions are reasonable
and legitimate business interests are being protected.60 Moreover, by defi-
nition, the post-employment noncompete that is pertinent to this article is
a separate contract or contract provision between an employer and an
individual employee. When accepting the noncompete the employee is
voluntarily agreeing to restrictions on her otherwise lawful post-
employment activities. The terms of the noncompete, thus, go beyond an
employee’s duty of loyalty and other fiduciary duties that apply only
during the employment relationship but not after.
For example, in Mohr v. Bank of New York Mellon Corp., the plaintiff-
employees had signed a “noncompetition covenant” with their former
employer and a successor entity.61 The agreement provided that they
“would not compete with the Mellon Corporation with any similar invest-
ment business within 50 miles of any city or town listed on a schedule to the
Agreement from the later of five years from the date of closing [of the sale
today contain some form of noncompetition clause, covenant not to compete, restrictive
covenant, or other agreement by the franchisee ‘not to compete with the franchise system it
is entering, either during the term of the franchise agreement or for a period following
termination of the agreement, or both.’ These noncompete agreements are one of the best
means available to a franchisor to protect its interest in its trademarks, service marks, trade
secrets, processes, and other confidential business information.” (endnote omitted)). For a
detailed discussion of restrictions found in noncompetition covenants in the franchise
context, see generally Robert W. Emerson, Franchising Covenants Against Competition, 80 IOWA
L. REV. 1049 (1995).
59For a discussion of the business encroachment phenomenon related to franchising and
some of the implications for the mobility of individual entrepreneurs, see Robert W. Emerson,
Franchise Encroachment, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 191 (2010); Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Territories:
A Community Standard, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 779, 788–94 (2010).
60See Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 18, at 169–70.
61371 Fed. App’x 10 (11th Cir. 2010) (unpublished opinion).
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of the original entity-employer] or twelve months after termination.”62
The agreement also included language that indicated the employees
understood that its violation would threaten the employer’s valuable
goodwill, as well as a provision that memorialized the parties’ sense of the
covenant’s presumed reasonableness.63 In addition, as other cases demon-
strate, standard noncompetition agreements are often included alongside
provisions addressing post-employment confidentiality, nonsolicitation
of clients, and nonsolicitation of fellow employees, all of which prohibit
post-employment activities that, absent these contractual terms, would
otherwise be permissible.64
When looking at the legitimate interests at stake, the courts will also
consider the nature and significance of the employee’s skills. The New
York Court of Appeals has pointed out that, “[i]n general, we have strictly
applied the rule to limit enforcement of broad restraints on competition”
and, in specific cases, have “limited the cognizable employer interests
under the first prong of the common-law rule to the protection against
misappropriation of the employer’s trade secrets or of confidential cus-
tomer lists, or protection from competition by a former employee whose
62Id. at 12.
63Id. at 13–14.
64See, e.g., Zambelli Fireworks Mfg. Co. v. Wood, 592 F.3d 412 (3d Cir. 2010). In Zambelli, a
fireworks company had the employee-defendant sign a noncompete that included several
typical restrictive covenant provisions, including the following:
1. A clause prohibiting Wood from “engag[ing] in any manner in the pyrotechnic busi-
ness” within the Continental United States or taking any position of employment with
any company engaged in the sale or production of pyrotechnic displays for a period of
two years after leaving Zambelli;
2. A non-solicitation provision proscribing Wood from soliciting any former customers or
clients of Zambelli as well as any Zambelli employees for alternative employment for a
period of two years after leaving Zambelli;
3. A confidentiality clause preventing the disclosure or use of trade secrets or any infor-
mation regarding the operation of Zambelli’s business;
4. A provision that Wood provide Zambelli with three months’ notice of resignation;
5. A provision permitting a court to modify the terms of the 2005 Agreement in order to
render it enforceable in the event the non-compete provision was found to be unrea-
sonable;
6. A provision whereby Wood agreed to pay all legal fees, costs, and expenses if Zambelli
prevailed in a legal proceeding to enforce the terms of the 2005 Agreement;
7. A choice of law provision stating that Pennsylvania law would govern the interpretation
of the 2005 Agreement.
Id. at 416.
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services are unique or extraordinary.”65 As is the case in New York, some
states evaluate whether an employee possesses such an extraordinary skill
and expertise that a strict imposition of post-employment restrictions is
necessary to protect the employer from unfair competition.66 However, not
all jurisdictions require such expertise and knowledge on the part of the
employee.67
In the vast majority of jurisdictions that do enforce noncompetes,
courts will use a reasonableness test. A typical articulation of the reason-
ableness standard comes from New York’s high court, the New York Court
of Appeals, in BDO Seidman v. Hirshberg.68 There the court stated the
common reasonableness test as follows:
The modern, prevailing common-law standard of reasonableness for
employee agreements not to compete applies a three-pronged test. A restraint
is reasonable only if it: (1) is no greater than is required for the protection of
the legitimate interest of the employer, (2) does not impose undue hardship on
the employee, and (3) is not injurious to the public. A violation of any prong
renders the covenant invalid.69
65BDO Seidman v. Hirshberg, 712 N.E.2d 1220, 1223 (N.Y. 1999) (citing Reed, Roberts
Assocs. v. Strauman, 353 N.E.2d 590 (N.Y. 1976)).
66Karpinski v. Ingrasci, 268 N.E.2d 751 (N.Y. 1971) (holding that oral surgeon skills in a rural
upstate New York community were not sufficiently unique and valuable to justify a refusal to
enforce the contractual protection of employer); see also BDO Seidman, 712 N.E.2d 1220
(holding accountant’s services and skills insufficiently extraordinary).
67For instance, some noncompete cases highlight that even low-skilled employees may be
subject to noncompete enforcement actions. See, e.g., Borg-Warner Protective Servs. Corp., v.
Guardsmark, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 495, 500 (E.D. Ky. 1996) (allowing noncompete enforcement
against retail store security guards due to employer investment in the employees’ training).
Even under California law, which bans noncompetes, courts may impose geographic restric-
tions on employee mobility to enforce nonsolicitation of an employer’s clients by former
employees. See Hair Club for Men, LLC v. Elite Solutions Hair Alternatives, Inc. 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 30167 (E.D. Cal. 2007) (granting an injunction based on a geographically
defined client-nonsolicitation agreement with former employee–hair stylists).
68712N.E.2d 1220, 1222–23 (N.Y. 1999).
69Id. at 1223 (citation omitted). The court went on to write:
New York has adopted this prevailing standard of reasonableness in determining the
validity of employee agreements not to compete. “In this context a restrictive covenant
will only be subject to specific enforcement to the extent that it is reasonable in time and
area, necessary to protect the employer’s legitimate interests, not harmful to the general
public and not unreasonably burdensome to the employee.”
Id. (quoting Reed, Roberts Assocs., 353 N.E.2d at 593).
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Pursuant to one form or another of the reasonableness test, the
majority of U.S. jurisdictions will enforce noncompetes to some extent.70
Research shows that most states have what can be construed as a moderate
level of noncompete enforcement.71 There are, however, states that impose
a virtual ban on noncompetes.72 Most famously, California has a strong,
long-standing position in favor of employee freedom and against noncom-
petes, and the state’s courts have continually upheld the ban based on
public policy grounds.73 However, jurisdictions that allow post-
employment noncompete enforcement will apply some version of the
reasonableness test coupled with an evaluation of the stakeholders’ inter-
ests.74 These states use the reasonableness test to balance the rights of the
parties to the contract, as well as to consider the policy impact and the
public interest.75
70See generally COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE, A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY (Brian Malsberger ed.,
2009).
71See Norman D. Bishara, Fifty Ways to Leave Your Employer: Relative Enforcement of Covenant Not
to Compete Agreements, Trends, and Implications for Employee Mobility Policy, 13 U. PENN. J. BUS. L.
753, 780 (2011) (“[T]he majority of states have followed a moderate course that seems to
comport with traditional noncompete aesthetics of moderation through narrowly tailored
and balanced—and reasonable—protectable interests that foster business investments in
workers’ human capital.”).
72The two states with near complete bans on covenants not to compete are North Dakota and
California, although both states permit restrictions on post-employment competition related
to an owner’s sale of a business. See Norman D. Bishara, Balancing Innovation from Employee
Mobility with Legal Protection for Human Capital Investment: 50 States, Public Policy, and Covenants
Not to Compete in an Information Economy, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 287, 294 n.19 (2006).
73A recent much-discussed California Supreme Court case on noncompetes addressed the
public policy implications of the state’s statutory ban on noncompetes. See Edwards v. Arthur
Andersen, LLP, 189 P.3d 285, 293 (Cal. 2008) (reiterating California’s strong public policy
against enforcing contractual restraints on employment and rejecting calls for a “narrow
restraint” exception); see also Bradford P. Anderson, Casenote, Edwards v. Arthur Andersen
LLP: There is not a “Narrow Restraint” Exception to California’s Prohibition of Noncompetition
Agreements, and a General Release May Not Mean What It Says, 39 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 163
(2009) (providing a detailed discussion of the potential policy implications of Edwards);
Bradford P. Anderson, Complete Harmony or Mere Detente? Shielding California Employees from
Non-Competition Covenants, 8 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 8 (2007) (arguing that California’s strong
public policy against impinging employee mobility also weighs heavily against allowing the
doctrine of inevitable disclosure in Edwards).
74See Gabel & Mansfield, supra note 19, at 321–22.
75See, e.g., Johnson Controls, Inc. v. APT Critical Systems, Inc., 323 F. Supp. 2d 525 (S.D.N.Y.
2004). In Johnson Controls, the court commented that,
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While noncompetes traditionally arise in the common law, there is a
trend among many states to codify their noncompete policies.76 Several
states are currently contemplating noncompete legislation, most notably
Massachusetts77 and Illinois.78 Some, such as Texas,79 have legislation out-
lining permissive boundaries for noncompetes. Others, such as Colo-
rado,80 disfavor noncompetes or ban them with significant exceptions. In
[i]n fashioning the [reasonableness] analysis, New York courts have endeavored to
balance public policy concerns relating to the benefits of competition and the unfettered
flow of talent and ideas in our economy with employers’ legitimate right to protect the
fruits of their labor, the idea being that the proper balancing of these factors will produce
the most wealth and innovation . . . for society. It is important to keep in mind, however,
that on a less grand scale the interests to be balanced are those of the individual
employer and employee.
Id. at 533–34 (citation omitted).
76As of 2010, seventeen states had enacted some form of legislation addressing the enforce-
ability of noncompete covenants. See Bishara, supra note 71. These states are Alabama,
California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Louisiana, Missouri, Montana, Nevada,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, and Wisconsin.
Other states, such as Tennessee and West Virginia, have basic antitrust statutes that are
invoked when evaluating noncompetes. See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-18-104, -25-101 (2011)
(disfavors any contract attempting to lessen competition); W. VA. CODE § 47-18-3(a) (2011)
(the state’s antitrust statute).
77See Will Brownsberger, Reform Noncompete Contracts, WILL BROWNSBERG—ST. REPRESENTATIVE,
DEMOCRAT, 24TH MIDDLESEX DISTRICT, http://willbrownsberger.com/index.php/end-
noncompete-contracts (last visited Oct. 7, 2011) (detailing state representative’s plan to
resubmit his co-sponsored noncompete reform legislation to the Massachusetts legislature).
78See Winston & Strawn LLP, HB 0016 Introduced to Create an “Illinois Covenants Not to Compete
Act” (Jan. 2011), http://www.winston.com/siteFiles/Publications/Updated_HB0016_Briefing.
pdf. Like Massachusetts’s proposed legislation, Illinois’s version of noncompete reform seeks
to formalize the bounds of the traditional reasonableness test by requiring the contract to be
“narrowly tailored to support the protection of a legitimate business interest” and apply it to
specific levels of employees. Id. The proposal also provides for rebuttable presumptions
“that a restrictive covenant is not narrowly tailored to promote a legitimate business interest
if ”:
(i) the covenant’s duration exceeds one year; (ii) the covenant’s geographic area extends
beyond any region in which the key employee provides employment services during the
one year preceding termination of the employment relationship; or (iii) the type of
services covered by the covenant extends beyond the nature of the work performed by
the key employee.
Id.
79TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 15.50 (2010)
80The Colorado statute is titled “Unlawful to intimidate worker—agreement not to compete”
and declares that “[i]t shall be unlawful to use force, threats, or other means of intimidation
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addition, new research related to the effects of noncompetes has started to
create a picture of the role of these mobility-inhibiting contracts, which
further sheds light on the possible economic role of restricting employee
mobility.81
The post-employment implications of noncompete enforcement are
clear for an affected employee.82 He is limited—at least for an amount of
time and a geographic or topical scope that a court finds to be
reasonable—from going to work for a competitor of his former employer
or from starting a competing business. While an employee who is subject
to an enforceable noncompete is prohibited from moving to a new position
that is contrary to the terms of the contract, the employer has, at least in
theory, already provided its consideration to support the agreement.83 In
to prevent any person from engaging in any lawful occupation at any place he sees fit.” COLO.
REV. STAT. § 8-2-113(1) (2010). However, subsection (2) provides several exceptions to this ban
on noncompetes. Specifically, section (2) states:
Any covenant not to compete which restricts the right of any person to receive com-
pensation for performance of skilled or unskilled labor for any employer shall be void,
but this subsection (2) shall not apply to:
(a) Any contract for the purchase and sale of a business or the assets of a business;
(b) Any contract for the protection of trade secrets;
(c) Any contractual provision providing for recovery of the expense of educating and
training an employee who has served an employer for a period of less than two years;
(d) Executive and management personnel and officers and employees who constitute
professional staff to executive and management personnel.
Id. § 8-2-113(2).
81See, e.g., Bruce Fallick et al., Job Hopping in Silicon Valley: Some Evidence Concerning the
Micro-Foundations of a High Technology Cluster, 88 REV. ECON. & STAT. 472 (2006) (measuring
higher rates of employee mobility in Silicon Valley, California’s high-tech sector, as compared
to other California industries or in a sample of states with enforcement of noncompetes);
Garmaise, supra note 33 (finding jurisdictions that enforce noncompetes will create an
environment that creates lower wages and less investment from employers in their employ-
ees); Matt Marx et al., Mobility, Skills, and the Michigan Non-Compete Experiment, 55 MGMT. SCI.
875 (2009) (using a natural experiment created by a change in noncompete enforcement law
to find lower rates of mobility under a policy of noncompete enforcement); Toby E. Stuart &
Olav Sorenson, Liquidity Events and the Distribution of Entrepreneurial Activity, 48 ADMIN. SCI. Q.
175 (2003) (studying the tendency of employees to become entrepreneurs after their
employer-firm undergoes a dramatic change using noncompetes as one variable).
82For a discussion of the implications for other employees, see infra Part III.A.1 and accom-
panying footnotes.
83Some states do not require additional consideration when a noncompete is signed after
employment has begun under a theory that continued employment or some additional terms
or conditions of employment, such as a promise to modify an at-will employment assumption,
are sufficient. See, e.g., Lake Land Emp’t Grp. of Akron, LLC v. Columber, 804 N.E.2d 27
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other words, the former employer does not normally have any additional
obligations once the terms of the noncompete are triggered by the termi-
nation of employment.
Again, policy makers acknowledge that noncompetes are by nature
anticompetitive and would normally be unenforceable as against public
policy.84 Accordingly, most state courts will allow a covenant not to
compete, but “only if it is necessary to protect a legitimate business inter-
est, reasonably limited in time and space, and consonant with the public
interest.”85 While the details vary by jurisdiction, legitimate protectable
business interests may include investments in training and building the
employee’s reputation; confidential and proprietary information, such as
customer lists and strategies; and client relationships.86 In effect, most
states recognize that some enforcement of noncompetes, however
limited, is allowable to protect the interests of employers in sharing con-
fidential and proprietary knowledge with their employees. This
approach is consistent with the historical role of equity in adjudicating
these disputes.87
In summary, even if a noncompete will lessen otherwise lawful com-
petition and potentially inhibit the flow of knowledge, most states today
will allow this compromise. Noncompetes can be controversial and have
been consistently disputed in litigation. Because noncompetes create the
risk that employers will overreach and improperly shift costs to employees,
(Ohio 2004) (resolving a split in the state appellate courts by concluding that an employee
continuing with an at-will employment relationship is sufficient consideration to support
assent to a noncompete); Rogers v. Runfola & Assocs., Inc., 565 N.E.2d 540, 542 (Ohio 1991)
(finding that a noncompete signed upon an employer’s promise to a formerly at-will
employee to discharge the employee only for specified causes is sufficient consideration).
However, other states may require new independent consideration to support a noncompete
for continuing at-will employees but not for employees who are terminable for good cause,
for whom mere continued employment is sufficient consideration. See, e.g., Stone v. Griffin
Communications, 53 S.W.3d 687, 693 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001).
84See, e.g., Reed, Roberts Assocs. v. Strauman, 353 N.E.2d 590, 592–93 (N.Y. 1976).
85Boulanger v. Dunkin’ Donuts Inc., 815 N.E.2d 572, 577 (Mass. 2004).
86See, e.g., Hyde, supra note 23, at 6.
87See generally T. Leigh Anenson, The Role of Equity in Employment Noncompetition Cases, 42 AM.
BUS. L.J. 1 (2005) (reviewing the history and role of the courts in the equitable analysis of
noncompetes and advocating for courts to balance competing interests of employers and
employees when settling noncompete disputes).
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the next sections discuss two alternative mechanisms that may still pro-
tect the employer’s interests, but have a more negative impact on the
employee’s freedom of mobility.
B. Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine
A relatively resurgent concept that has yet to gain much traction in U.S.
jurisprudence is the inevitable disclosure doctrine.88 The thrust of the
concept is the assumption that a former employee who was privileged to
acquire an employer’s confidential information or trade secret will inevi-
tably use or disclose the knowledge in her new employment.89 Therefore,
a judicial injunction is sought to prohibit the employee from beginning the
new employment based on allegations of a threatened misappropriation,
coupled with irreparable harm and, to some extent in various jurisdic-
tions, bad faith.90 Essentially, a handful of states allow an employer to
argue, even in the absence of a noncompete agreement, to “enjoin a
departing employee from taking a job on the grounds that he or she will
‘inevitably disclose’ some unspecified trade secret.”91 Inevitable disclosure
developed in the common law and has seen a revival in its attempted
application since the widespread adoption of the Uniform Trade Secret Act
and, in particular, following the 1995 Seventh Circuit case of PepsiCo v.
88The doctrine also has not seen much treatment in the academic literature. Following
resurgence in the debate over inevitable disclosure and its wider application to address
threatened trade secret misappropriation in the mid 1990s, several student notes and com-
ments addressed the topic. See, e.g., Jonathan O. Harris, Note, The Doctrine of Inevitable
Disclosure: A Proposal to Balance Employer and Employee Interests, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 325 (2000);
David Lincicum, Note, Inevitable Conflict: California’s Policy of Worker Mobility and the Doctrine of
“Inevitable Disclosure,” 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1257 (2002); Jennifer L. Saulino, Note, Locating
Inevitable Disclosure’s Place in Trade Secret Analysis, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1184 (2002); Brandy L.
Treadway, Comment, An Overview of Individual States’ Application of Inevitable Disclosure: Con-
crete Doctrine or Equitable Tool? 55 SMU L. REV. 621 (2002); Susan Street Whaley, Comment,
The Inevitable Disaster of Inevitable Disclosure, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 809 (1999). While these articles
are useful, a full scholarly treatment of the subject in the business law literature is seemingly
available only from Garrison & Wendt, supra note 4, at 148–64.
89See Hyde, supra note 23, at 9 (criticizing New Jersey for a lack of venture capital or a culture
or infrastructure of startups and pointing out that the state “vigorously enforces noncom-
petes” and is one of possibly three states that has supported an inevitable disclosure regime).
90See Eleanore R. Godfrey, Note, Inevitable Disclosure of Trade Secrets: Employee Mobility v.
Employer’s Rights, 3 J. HIGH TECH. L. 161, 176–77 (2004).
91Id. at 9.
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Redmond.92 In that case, Redmond, the former executive, left PepsiCo for
Quaker Oats, a competitor in the sports drink market.93 Because PepsiCo
believed Redmond would inevitably disclose confidential information and
trade secrets related to pricing and marketing plans, it brought suit and,
eventually, was granted an injunction based on a theory of inevitable
disclosure.94
While injunctive relief based on an inevitable disclosure theory may
be rare, one can imagine an employer arguing for inevitable disclosure–
based injunctive relief as part of the irreparable harm contemplated by a
court when evaluating a request for a preliminary injunction.95 A court
could be more amenable to the argument that irreparable harm will occur
initially during a time-sensitive and short-term relief of a temporary
restraining order. In contrast, a long-term permanent restraining order
seems less likely because of the potentially open-ended mobility restriction
that would result. This concern would be particularly troubling if there
were assurances that the trade secret will not be conveyed, perhaps
because of an existing and enforceable nondisclosure agreement.
However, where there is evidence of wrongdoing or behavior consis-
tent with the misappropriation of trade secrets, a court may be more likely
to restrict the departing employee’s choice of mobility under a theory of
inevitable disclosure. For instance, in Bimbo Bakeries, Inc. v. Botticella, the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals was asked to review a trade secret misap-
propriation case where a departing executive was one of only a few indi-
viduals with access to the plaintiff’s trade secret, the process for creating
famous Thomas’ English Muffins “nooks and crannies.”96 In the absence of
a noncompete (presumably because the original employment had been in
9254 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir. 1995). For a detailed description of the PepsiCo case, the development
of the inevitable disclosure doctrine, and its implications, see Garrison & Wendt, supra note
4, at 148–64.
93Garrison & Wendt, supra note 4, at 153.
94Id.
95Some sources assert that only a few states have embraced inevitable disclosure. See, e.g.,
Hyde, supra note 23, at 9 (harshly criticizing New Jersey for allowing inevitable disclosure
arguments and stating that perhaps three states subscribe to the inevitable disclosure doc-
trine). But see Treadway, supra note 88, at 626–49 (finding in 2002 that eight states had
adopted the doctrine, four states lacked definitive case law on the subject, six states adopted
a limited version of the doctrine, and three states had rejected it outright).
96Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. v. Botticella, 613 F.3d 102 (3rd Cir. 2010).
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California), the appellate court reviewed the trial court’s grant of a
preliminary injunction prohibiting the employee from working for a
competitor. After secretly accepting employment with a competitor, the
employee-defendant had continued to work for the plaintiff for some time
in a knowledge-sensitive role.97 Even though the employee had signed a
“Confidentiality, Non-Solicitation and Invention Assignment Agree-
ment,”98 the court upheld the injunction under a theory of inevitable
disclosure, at least in the short term.99
Interestingly, the Bimbo court added that there were multiple issues
of public interest at play in such a case, including upholding the sanctity of
confidentiality agreements and protecting trade secrets.100 The court also
listed several additional interests, including “a public interest in employers
being free to hire whom they please and in employees being free to work
for whom they please” and citing with approval Pennsylvania precedents
that had articulated “a societal interest in employee mobility.”101
As discussed below, criticism of inevitable disclosure from an ethical
perspective is perhaps easier than a critique of noncompetes, because the
inevitable disclosure logic allows an employer to restrict mobility without
ever bargaining or paying for the right to restrict a knowledge transfer,
even when that improper knowledge transfer is subconscious.102 Because it
is not a contract-based remedy, an employer seeking inevitable disclosure
protection is essentially arguing for a default rule to protect its intellectual
property as captured in a trade secret even before there is evidence of
misappropriation of that secret. The employer, thus, must ask for a court
to determine that a former employee will eventually, even unconsciously,
97Id. at 105–06.
98Id. at 105.
99Id.
100Id. at 119.
101Id. (citing Wexler v. Greenberg, 160 A.2d 430, 434–35 (Pa. 1960)).
102See Robin Feldman, The Role of the Subconscious in Intellectual Property Law, 2 HASTINGS SCI. &
TECH. L.J. 1, 12–14 (2010) (commenting that inevitable disclosure may initially appear to
conflict with a trade secret approach to limiting knowledge transfer, but that “[w]ith general
skills and knowledge, the law recognizes the difficulty of limiting the subconscious, declaring
the information beyond the bounds of trade secret law and giving the employee free reign to
use the information in a new job”). Feldman adds that, in the case of inevitable disclosure,
“the law also recognizes the difficulty of limiting the subconscious, but this time, it drastically
limits the employee’s freedom, restricting the employee from taking a related job.” Id. at 13.
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divulge or otherwise use the trade secret in competition. In effect, the
remedy is a prohibition on the former employee going to work for a
competitor where the trade secret will surely be used sooner or later.
Perhaps worse, the implication is that, with an application of inevi-
table disclosure, the restriction on mobility is not bounded in time and
geographic scope, as is the case with a noncompete term that is subject to
a reasonableness test. To the contrary, the information that is the subject of
the trade secret in an inevitable disclosure action will be protectable—and
thus the grounds to prevent the employee from moving freely—for some
indefinite period that could be as long as the information remains a bona
fide trade secret giving the firm a competitive advantage.
Having discussed our concerns thus far with covenants not to
compete and the doctrine of inevitable disclosure, we now turn to garden
leave, a less well-known contractual tool that also is designed to restrict
employee mobility.
C. Garden Leave
Garden leave, also sometimes called gardening leave, is a relatively
new mechanism for limiting post-employment mobility. Originally a
concept in British law, there is some evidence that it is beginning to be used
in the United States.103 Like a noncompete, but unlike the doctrine of
inevitable disclosure, garden leave is a contract-based restriction on
mobility, which results from the parties’ negotiation. There are few dis-
cussions of garden leave in the U.S. academic literature,104 although both
103See generally Greg T. Lembrich, Note, Garden Leave: A Possible Solution to the Uncertain
Enforceability of Restrictive Employment Covenants, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2291 (2002) (“Garden
leave may provide a solution to the prevailing uncertainty regarding the enforceability of
restrictive covenants in the United States. Whether it will do so is a question that remains to
be answered. Having observed the efficacy of such provisions across the Atlantic, many
American employers in competitive industries have begun putting garden leave clauses into
the contracts of their own key employees in hope that these provisions will prove to be more
reliably enforceable than have the traditional post-employment restrictive covenants. As yet,
however, American courts have not ruled on the legitimacy of garden leave provisions.”).
104An August 2011 search of all law journals for all available years in the LexisNexis database
reveals only about fifteen scholarly articles mentioning garden leave in a substantive manner,
and several of those exclusively deal with the Australian or British legal systems. Most of these
articles merely cite a 2002 student note by Greg Lembrich. See id. At the time of that article,
Lembrich’s research indicated, “American courts have not ruled on the legitimacy of garden
leave provisions.” Id. at 2293. He added that “American commentators have also been slow to
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media105 and practitioners106 have noted its increasing use by U.S. employ-
ers for various types of employees.
In the case of garden leave, “the employee agrees to give notice some
months prior to departure—say, six months—during which period the
employer must pay the employee’s salary but may choose not to assign any
duties, and in any event may prevent the employee from working else-
where.”107 Thus, rather than leaving the employer and immediately begin-
ning work for a competing enterprise, the employee is paid to remain at
home and, at least metaphorically, work only in her garden. Accordingly,
garden leave serves as a “means of avoiding the restraints on specific
performance” because
the employer . . . contract[s] for a relatively long period of notice by the
employee to terminate the employment, and . . . pay[s] the employee’s salary
during this period without requiring the employee to come into work . . . on
the assumption that the employee will have to stay home and work in the
garden, but will be financially secure until the period of notice expires and he
or she is then free to work for the competitor.108
Garden leave is like a noncompete in that it protects an employer’s
interest in information by limiting employee mobility, but it has the extra
advantage of forcing the employer to bear those costs, post-employment,
which compensates the employee. Thus, because the employer has an
immediate and tangible cost to restricting mobility, the employer will refrain
from using garden leave to restrict the mobility of lower-level employees
address garden leave as a potential solution to the problem [of uncertain noncompete
enforcement]” and that only a few U.S. practitioner articles had addressed the subject. Id. at
2293 n.5.
105See, e.g., Joe Rauch, BofA’s U.S. Trust Adding “Garden Leave” for Some, REUTERS (Feb 18,
2011), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/18/us-bankofamerica-ustrust-
idUSTRE71H4OZ20110218; Son, supra note 7.
106See, e.g., Thomas B. Lewis & Mark F. Kowal, Garden Leave Provisions: A Growing Trend in
Employment Agreements, N.J. L. J., Apr. 18, 2011, at S-12, available at http://www.njlawblog.com/
uploads/file/TBL%20MFK%20-%20NJLJ%20-%204_18_11.pdf; Christopher P. Stief, What
In-House Counsel Should Know About “Garden Leave” Clauses, CORPORATE COUNSEL (Oct. 22,
2008), http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1202425435456 (reporting that
“ ‘garden leave’ employment agreements start to bloom in the United States”).
107Cynthia L. Estlund, Between Rights and Contract: Arbitration Agreements and Non-Compete
Covenants as a Hybrid Form of Employment Law, 155 U. PENN. L. REV. 379, 425 (2006).
108Bob Hepple, The Duty of Employee Loyalty in English Law, 20 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 205, 214
(1999).
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who do not really have confidential knowledge. Moreover, employers will
avoid paying garden leave even to top managers for longer than is necessary
to protect valuable knowledge. It is, therefore, less subject than a noncom-
pete to the criticism that an employee’s right to earn a living is ignored.
The uncertainty and troublesome aspects of noncompetes have, not
surprisingly, made the garden leave option more attractive in some ways to
protect both employer and employee interests. As one set of practical
advice from corporate lawyers has framed these issues,
American courts usually enforce noncompetes only when they are reasonable
and protect an employer’s legitimate business interest. As many courts value
free mobility of employees and open and fair competition, courts are com-
monly cautious when deciding the scope and/or enforceability of noncom-
petes. This uncertainty has created an environment where employers may be
unable to sufficiently protect their interests against departing, well-trained,
highly productive employees. A “garden leave provision” may effectively
protect the legitimate interests of the business while not causing a financial
hardship to the employee.109
In light of the potential mutual benefits to both employers and employees
provided by garden leave, and because it is less controversial than non-
compete restrictions, these provisions may prove to be a popular alterna-
tive to other mobility-inhibiting mechanisms.110
Accordingly, how to determine the proper public policy balance
between protecting employee mobility and regulating sensitive knowledge
flows through endorsing noncompetes, the doctrine of inevitable disclo-
sure, or garden leave remains an open question for courts and legislatures.
In the next section, we go beyond simply examining the legal enforcement
and business efficiency questions about restricting employees’ post-
employment mobility and address questions about the business ethics of
such restrictions.
III. AN ETHICS CRITIQUE OF RESTRICTIONS ON
EMPLOYEE MOBILITY
Lawmakers drafting legislation addressing employee mobility restrictions,
as well as judges officiating in litigation to enforce them, may allude to
109Lewis & Kowal, supra note 106, at S-12.
110See, e.g., Lembrich, supra note 103, at 2314–19 (discussing several reasons why U.S. courts
may find enforcing garden leave provisions preferable to enforcing noncompetes).
2012 / Law and Ethics of Post-Employment Mobility 27
various philosophical arguments in determining the reasonableness and
public policy impacts of such measures. For example, the first step of the
three-pronged test for reasonableness of noncompetes111 evaluates
whether legitimate business interests are implicated, alluding to the exist-
ence of competing property rights.112 The second step assesses hardship on
the employee,113 which suggests that concerns over fairness and equity may
be at issue.114 The final step considers the effect on the general public,115
indicating the relevance of a utilitarian analysis—weighing the social costs
and benefits of enforcing a noncompete.116 However, lawmakers and
judges may not have systematically thought through the deeper philo-
sophical basis for these arguments. To assist in this evaluation, we explore
Lockean property rights and more fundamental rights, utilitarian philoso-
111BDO Seidman v. Hirshberg, 712 N.E.2d 1220, 1223 (N.Y. 1999).
112See, e.g., Hickory Specialties, Inc. v. Forest Flavors Int’l, Inc., 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 11786
(6th Cir. 2000) (unpublished decision) (addressing the enforcement of a noncompete where
the issue concerned who owned property rights in trade secrets involving the process of
manufacturing liquid smoke); F.S. New Prods., Inc. v. Strong Indus., Inc., 129 S.W.3d 606,
630–31 (Tex. App. 2004) (discussing how a noncompete applies to property rights
in an employee’s knowledge concerning the design and manufacture of trailing axle
assemblies).
113See BDO Seidman, 712 N.E.2d at 1223.
114See, e.g., Iowa Glass Depot, Inc. v. Jindrich, 338 N.W.2d 376 (Iowa 1983) (“[W]e are
required to consider the employee’s situation and the surrounding circumstances in order to
fairly weigh the interests of the parties.”); Holland v. Brown, 156 A. 168 (Pa. 1931) (discussing
whether the geographic limitation of the noncompete agreement “affords a fair protection to
plaintiffs and does not oppress defendants”).
115See BDO Seidman, 712 N.E.2d at 1223.
116See, e.g., Marsh USA, Inc. v. Cook, 54 TEX. SUP. CT. J. 1234, 2011 Tex. LEXIS 465 (Tex.
2011). In Marsh USA the court wrote,
Restrictive covenants are not costless, and even a mutually acceptable noncompete can
impose a deadweight loss on broader society. Courts should not confuse a noncompete’s
impact on the employee with its impact on competition. A restraint may be perfectly
agreeable to both parties today but still harm consumers tomorrow. Moreover, as our
economy becomes even more technologically advanced and knowledge-based (key con-
tributors to a so-called high-velocity labor market), overreaching restrictions lock up
human capital and decelerate the beneficial knowledge spillover that accrues from
greater mobility. It remains the job of courts to be vigilant for practices that tend to
servility, that deprive the public of desired services, and that quash rivals via forced
restriction rather than forceful competition.
Id. at *64–65.
28 Vol. 49 / American Business Law Journal
phy developed from the writings of Bentham and Mill, and Rawlsian
considerations of justice and fairness as applied to restrictions on employee
mobility.
Thus, we explore frameworks from both the contractualist and the
consequentialist perspectives of ethical philosophy. Other prominent per-
spectives within business ethics research include deontological, or duty-
based, perspectives,117 and virtue ethics philosophy, an approach based on
improving and acting consistently with character.118 The law governing
noncompetes, however, does not appear to incorporate the consideration
of duties or character. Consequently, these other ethical frameworks are
beyond the scope of this article.
Turning first to the perspective of property rights, this section con-
siders Locke’s natural law arguments on the property rights to the fruits of
one’s labor, as well as Locke’s discussion of the contractual rights of master
and servant. Within this discussion we will consider the concepts of consent
and freedom to contract. Locke’s view will be contrasted with Werhane’s
conception of rights. After considering the ethics of employee mobility
restrictions through a property rights lens, we will turn to a utilitarian
cost–benefit analysis and then to a Rawlsian perspective on justice as
fairness. We then conclude with recommendations for deeper analysis in
legislative and judicial decision making regarding restraints on employee
mobility.
117Deontological perspectives consider the morality of the act itself, rather than the conse-
quences of the act. See Timothy L. Fort, Goldilocks and Business Ethics: A Paradigm That Fits “Just
Right,” 23 IOWA J. CORP. L. 245 (1997) (reviewing various approaches to business ethics);
Edwin R. Micewski & Carmelita Troy, Business Ethics—Deontologically Revisited, 72 J. BUS.
ETHICS 17 (2007) (applying deontological ethics to evaluate cases of accounting fraud and
asserting that principles of deontology should guide executive decision making).
118Virtue ethics can relate to developing and acting consistently with personal character. See,
e.g., Robert Solomon, Victim of Circumstances? A Defense of Virtue Ethics in Business, 13 BUS.
ETHICS Q. 43 (2003). Virtue ethics also has been applied on the organizational level to
developing a “corporate character.” See Geoff Moore, Corporate Character: Modern Virtue Ethics
and the Virtuous Corporation, 15 BUS. ETHICS Q. 659 (2005). Virtue ethics is often discussed in
a normative manner. See, e.g., George Gotsis & Zoey Kortezi, Ethical Considerations in Organi-
zational Politics: Expanding the Perspective, 93 J. BUS. ETHICS 497 (2010). Moreover, because
determining which virtues are important to good character may be somewhat subjective, the
virtue ethics approach may be most appropriate in a case-based analysis. See, e.g., Rosa Chun,
A Corporate’s Responsibility to Employees During a Merger: Organizational Virtue and Employee
Loyalty, 9 CORP. GOVERNANCE 473, 474 (2009) (explaining “the impact of the poorly perceived
organizational virtue on employees’ emotional response to the merged organization”).
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A. Property Rights Perspective
Scholars have suggested that John Locke’s concepts of property rights in
one’s labor and the freedom to contract out one’s labor to others underlie
U.S. employment law.119 Locke, in his Second Treatise on Government, spoke
of the basis for property rights being deduced on a moral basis from
natural law. According to Locke, natural law suggests that “every Man has
a Property in his own Person. . . . The Labour of his Body, and the Work of his
Hands, we may say, are properly his.”120 This natural property right that
all persons have in their labor is necessary for subsistence and arises from
every person’s natural right to self-preservation.121 Locke finds there is not
only an individual right to self-preservation but there is also an obligation
on others to respect each person’s right to self-preservation. Locke derives
this right for self-preservation from the argument that humans were
created as God’s servants, to survive at His pleasure rather than at one
another’s pleasure.122 For purposes of self-preservation, mankind has the
right to procure from the commons the food and drink and whatever else
is necessary for survival.123 Thus, according to Locke, there is a moral basis
for individuals to have property interests in their own bodies and labor, the
returns of which naturally belong to those individuals.
119See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LAWS 21 (1992) [hereinafter EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS] (“Although that notion of owner-
ship [of one’s own labor] did not mean that every person could do exactly what he wanted,
it did mean that no person could commandeer the labor of another for his own private use.
The ability to use the talents of other persons depended not on coercion but rather on
consent—including consent that was purchased in voluntary transactions.”); see also RICHARD
A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD (1995) [hereinafter EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES].
120LOCKE, supra note 2, at 18.
121Id. at 4–5 (“Every one, as he is bound to preserve himself, and not to quit his station wilfully;
so by the like reason, when his own preservation comes not in competition, ought he, as much
as he can, to preserve the rest of mankind, and may not, unless it be to do justice on an offender,
take away, or impair the life, or what tends to the preservation of the life, the liberty, health,
limb, or goods of another.”).
122Id. at 4 (“[N]o one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions: for men
being all the workmanship of one omnipotent, and infinitely wise maker; all the servants of
one sovereign master, sent into the world by his order, and about his business; they are
his property, whose workmanship they are, made to last during his, not one another’s
pleasure.”).
123Id. at 17–18 (“Whether we consider natural reason, which tells us, that men, being once
born, have a right to their preservation, and consequently to meat and drink, and such other
things as nature affords for their subsistence . . . .”).
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When it comes to one’s property rights in one’s self, Locke suggests
that, under the terms of natural law, “man . . . cannot, by compact, or his
own consent, enslave himself to any one, nor put himself under the
absolute, arbitrary power of another.”124 Nevertheless, Locke recognizes
that an individual has the freedom to trade or exchange property that is
the fruit of his labor, as well as trading the labor itself. Thus, in “a state of
perfect freedom [men are free] to order their actions, and dispose of their
possessions and persons, as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of
nature.”125 In this light, Locke recognizes that a man is free to sell his
services for wages, which “gives the master but a temporary power over
him, and no greater, than what is contained in the contract between
‘em.”126
In this way, the concept of freedom to contract becomes relevant in
Locke’s philosophy, as well as the strict interpretation of contractual terms.
During the time of the contract between master (employer) and servant
(employee), Locke indicates that the labor of the servant belongs com-
pletely to the master: “Thus the grass my horse has bit; the turfs my
servant has cut; . . . become my property. . . . The labour that was mine,
removing them out of that common state they were in, hath fixed my property
in them.”127 These clauses are relevant to a consideration of legal restric-
tions on employee mobility from a rights-based ethical framework.
The master’s (employer’s) ownership of the product of the servant’s
(employee’s) labor is well recognized today. Modern scholars acknowledge
that businesses can have property rights in the capital, technology, and
information used by employees to contribute productively to the business,
as well as property rights to the results of the employee’s production.128
Nevertheless, Werhane suggests that property rights are secondary to
more fundamental moral rights, such as freedom and the equal opportu-
124Id. at 15 (emphasis omitted). This position has been criticized in the literature, given that
Locke invested in the slave trade and had a role in drafting the Carolina constitution, which
accounts for the practice of slavery. See, e.g., Jennifer Welchman, Locke on Slavery and Inalien-
able Rights, 25 CAN. J. PHIL. 67 (1995).
125LOCKE, supra note 2, at 3 (emphasis omitted).
126Id. at 50 (emphasis omitted).
127Id. at 19.
128See, e.g., PATRICIA H. WERHANE ET AL., EMPLOYMENT AND EMPLOYEE RIGHTS (2004); PATRICIA H.
WERHANE, PERSONS, RIGHTS, AND CORPORATIONS 21 (1985).
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nity to self-development.129 These more fundamental rights may bring
about the necessity for compromise when it comes to protecting property
rights. These considerations are relevant in the evaluation of public policy
on legal restrictions to employee mobility, as discussed in the following
sections.
1. Noncompetes
Under Locke’s concept of freedom to contract labor services, individuals
are free to agree to contractual terms detailing the duration and extent of
the relationship between master and servant. When it comes to noncom-
petes, however, what is at issue is the ownership and deployment of the
productive capacity represented by the employee’s knowledge, skills, and
talents beyond the termination of the labor contract. Noncompetes contro-
versially allow the former employer to assert a continuing right in restrict-
ing the employee’s use of that productive capacity after the employee is no
longer working for that employer, nor receiving continued compensation,
nor bound by the normal common law duties of loyalty to a current
employer.130
Obviously, this continuing, postcontractual right is quite valuable to
the employer, intent on reducing the threat of competition after an
employment contract is terminated and an employee has departed. But
noncompetes can also be beneficial to employers even while the employ-
ment contract is still in force. Noncompetes allow the employer to increase
the predictability of access to an important resource, in this case a human
resource, by raising the opportunity cost of the employee leaving to work
for a competitor.131 In other words, this is a strategy for reducing the flight
risk of valuable employee assets. Accordingly, with the greater certainty of
129WERHANE, supra note 128, at 21–22 (“It must be acknowledged, however, that private
ownership is not on a par with the most basic rights . . . . What we wish to show is that a
private enterprise economic system that recognizes private ownership as a moral right is not
antithetical to individual liberty, in particular the freedom to develop autonomously one’s
own life.”).
130See Rachel Arnow-Richman, Bargaining for Loyalty in the Information Age: A Reconsideration of
the Role of Substantive Fairness in Enforcing Employee Noncompetes, 80 OR. L. REV. 1163, 1182–85
(2001); supra Part II.A.
131See generally Paul H. Rubin & Peter Shedd, Human Capital and Covenants Not to Compete, 10
J. LEGAL STUD. 93 96–99 (1981) (analyzing restrictive employment covenants in terms of the
distribution of training costs and the incentives that training creates).
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staffing that comes with an enforceable noncompete, an employer is more
likely to invest in the employee by investing in valuable human capital.132
Noncompetes are also important to employers in that they can be used
defensively when they contain antipoaching or antiraiding provisions that
not only prohibit a former employee from competing, but also prevent the
employee from eviscerating the former employer’s staff by luring away the
best and brightest workers.
An additional argument supporting these restrictions is that a non-
compete is a contract clause that, like any contractual issue, is binding only
upon mutual consent. Locke suggests that an individual has the freedom
to consent to any agreement to sell her labor services—that is, to become
a servant to a master or an employee to an employer.133 Where consent is
given, the fruits of the employee’s labor belong to the employer to the full
extent of the agreed-upon contractual terms.134 The initial question that
begs to be answered is, how does one define consent? Locke asserts that
natural law limits the freedom to contract at the point where doing so
would involve consenting to arbitrary constraints on an individual’s right
to liberty, such as constraints amounting to enslavement or constraints on
an individual’s right to subsistence and self-preservation.135 As has been
noted, the definition of consent can be troublesome because consent comes
very close to coercion when one agrees to go along with an action due to
lack of information or simply because no other feasible option is avail-
able.136 Yet, as discussed below, because of unequal bargaining power,
employees often find they are required to sign nonnegotiable, boilerplate
noncompetes if they want to keep their jobs.137
132See Bishara, supra note 72, at 304.
133LOCKE, supra note 2, at 3.
134Id. at 50.
135Id.; see also id. at 15–16.
136Michael Keeley, Continuing the Social Contract Tradition, 5 BUS. ETHICS Q. 241, 241 (1995)
(questioning “the concept of consent as a viable ethical criterion” and arguing “for an
alternate principle of impartiality as a more appropriate moral norm in a social contract
theory of organizations”).
137See Rachel Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap Contracts: The Rise of Delayed Term, Standard Form
Employment Agreements, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 637, 649 n.60 (2007) (“Courts have generally rejected
claims brought by employees fired for refusing to sign a noncompete.” (citing Maw v.
Advanced Clinical Commc’ns, Inc., 846 A.2d 604, 611 (N.J. 2004) (holding that termination
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Professor Richard Epstein has evaluated how Locke’s concepts of
property rights in one’s labor and the freedom to contract out one’s
labor to others underlie U.S. employment law.138 Under freedom of con-
tract, there may be an assumption that employers and employees agree
to complete contracts, with all the terms fully negotiated, understood,
and spelled out.139 In this sense, if an employee accepts in advance that
a noncompete covenant is part of the bargain, is the subsequent enforce-
ment of that agreement a violation of the employee’s rights? In a
Lockean freedom to contract world, the answer may be “no”; otherwise,
what is the point of such contracts? However, it seems inconsistent with
a Lockean concept of property in one’s person to hold a noncompete
clause to be binding when the terms of the contract were not presented
until after one started working, which is when one has declined any
other prospective job offers. Further, is it even possible for the employee
to consent to a noncompete covenant if she does not fully understand
what she may be giving away at some future point? To what extent
would an employee truly understand the value of her skills at some
unspecified point in the future? Even if the employee were to have full
awareness of the rights she is giving away in a noncompete, there is the
question of whether the employee has an equal and free ability to nego-
tiate these terms. As discussed below, several critiques have been put
forward regarding the employee’s consent to waive future rights, as
occurs with a noncompete. Next, we will consider how a rights-based
perspective might weigh in on these debates.
Freedom of contract assumes that the terms of a contract are freely
negotiated. However, in the current employment context, the terms of a
noncompete are not necessarily open for negotiation. As such,
[t]he new model of private ordering in employment relies on boilerplate
documents, unilaterally drafted by the employer and presented as a condi-
for refusal to sign overbroad noncompete did not give rise to claim of wrongful discharge in
violation of public policy))).
138See EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 119, at 21.
139Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947, 955 (1984). But
cf. Mark Roehling & Wendy Boswell, “Good Cause Beliefs” in an “At-Will World”?: A Focused
Investigation of Psychological Versus Legal Contracts, 16 EMP. RESPS. & RTS. J. 211 (2004) (revealing
that employees’ beliefs regarding job security are much stronger than the rights reflected in
the terms of their contracts, based on an empirical exploration comparing employees’
assumptions about their employment contracts to the actual legal contractual terms).
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tion of employment, often subsequent to the start of work. Their purpose is
not to memorialize a negotiated set of terms, but to extract waivers of rights,
thus realigning statutory and default rules to better reflect employers’
interests.140
Stone suggests that, earlier in history, courts were very suspicions of non-
competes in employment relationships because “they were often the
result of vastly uneven bargaining power and thus contracts of adhe-
sion.”141 The tides have shifted, though, and many authors have dis-
cussed the legal and ethical implications of differences in bargaining
power between employees and employers.142
Many factors may limit an employee’s ability to negotiate the terms of
a noncompete agreement. For example, the employer’s timing in proffer-
ing the noncompete may affect the balance of bargaining power. As Arnow-
Richman notes, the employer can require the employee to sign a
noncompete at the point when the employee accepts the job or at some
point after the employee has started working.143 Cognitive reasons may
make it difficult for an employee to fully appreciate what she is agreeing to
in signing a noncompete when she accepts a job.144 At the beginning of an
employment relationship, employees tend to be optimistic about their
140Arnow-Richman, supra note 137, at 639.
141Katherine V.W. Stone, Knowledge at Work: Disputes over the Ownership of Human Capital in the
Changing Workplace, 34 CONN. L. REV. 721, 721–63 (2001).
142See, e.g., Gerhard Blickle & Alexander Witzki, New Psychological Contracts in the World of
Work: Economic Citizens or Victims of the Market? 3 SOC’Y & BUS. REV. 149 (2008) (describing the
underlying causes for changes in employment conditions and presenting empirical findings
on individuals coping with career changes); David Hart & Jeffrey Thompson, Untangling
Employee Loyalty: A Psychological Contract Perspective, 17 BUS. ETHICS Q. 297 (2007) (viewing
loyalty as a cognitive phenomenon, presenting a framework that defines the construct, and
anticipating obligations and asymmetries in loyalty); Pauline T. Kim, A Study of Worker
Perceptions of Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105 (1997) (finding that
workers overwhelmingly misunderstand legal rules governing employment relationships,
overestimating job protections and employee rights).
143Arnow-Richman, supra note 137, at 639.
144See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L.
REV. 211, 251–52 (1995) (showing that limits of cognition explain many limits on the bargain
principle, that a contracting party will act with full cognition to rationally maximize his
subjective expected utility). Eisenberg argues that classes of contract provisions and classes of
contracts, such as employment contracts, are systematically affected by the limits of cognition,
such that the premise of the bargain principle is not fulfilled. Id.
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future with that firm.145 This has been compared to the period of court-
ship, where a suitor is unlikely to raise questions about the end of the
relationship and risk appearing not committed to its success.146 At the start
of an employment relationship, employees are not likely to be anticipating
reasons they might be later interested in an employment opportunity with
another employer, or at least they are reluctant to acknowledge that when
starting a new job. In addition, at the outset, employees may not anticipate
the hardship of being unable to work in their chosen field for a year or
maybe even up to three years.147 Employees are not likely to think about
the fact that their skills could be rendered obsolete if they are required to
spend a significant amount of time outside of their field, which could
damage their future ability to sell their skills and services to other
employers.
Noncompetes are also often required as a condition of continued
employment when an employee has already been working for the firm for
some time. It may be more difficult for the employee to decline to sign a
noncompete agreement, as she has not been on the job market recently
and does not readily have other employment options. In many states, an
offer of continued employment is legitimate consideration for signing a
noncompete,148 meaning that the employee may be in the position of
having to sign the agreement or immediately leave the firm.149 This take-
it-or-leave-it approach certainly limits employee bargaining power to
145Viva R. Moffat, The Wrong Tool for the Job: The IP Problem with Noncompetition Agreements, 52
WM. & MARY L. REV. 873, 891–92 (2010).
146Id. at 891 & n.58 (citing Samuel Issacharoff, Contracting for Employment: The Limited Return
of the Common Law, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1783, 1794–95 (1996)).
147See Moffat, supra note 145, at 886 & n.43 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188
cmt. g (1981)). Moffat notes that “[t]he drafters of the Restatement (Third) of Employment
Law have apparently struggled with the proper approach to take. The draft provision
permits limited enforcement of noncompetes, and it does not appear to acknowledge the
bargaining process concerns.” Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 8.06
(Preliminary Draft Nov. 7, 2010)).
148See Bishara, supra note 71, at 776, 792 fig.10 (mentioning the policies of some states that
provide for continued employment to serve as sufficient legal consideration for a covenant
not to compete).
149See O’Neill, supra note 14, at 84 (arguing that courts should “minimiz[e] the enforcement
of covenants not to compete where the assenting employee lacks significant bargaining power
while preserving employers’ abilities to enforce these covenants against employees who enjoy
such power” as a safeguard for vulnerable employees).
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negotiate the terms of a noncompete. By contrast, the bargaining power
prior to employment is perhaps not as limited because, at least at that
moment, the employee could turn down the employment offer. Although
this may be unrealistic in that the employee may still have difficulty in
properly valuing the cost of a restriction that is buried among other terms
in the agreement and that is not triggered until the potentially distant
termination.
Noncompete clauses also may be proffered at the end of an employ-
ment relationship. Which party holds the stronger bargaining power could
completely depend upon the circumstances—for instance, whether the
employer or employee is about to terminate the relationship. Where the
employee is planning to move on to another job, she may have little
incentive to offer the employer any protection against unfair competition.
But, where the employee has been fired, the employer holds all the
bargaining power, and the employee may be fully cognizant of the hard-
ship that a noncompete may bring as she anticipates a stretch of time
without employment in her chosen field.150
Some argue that public policy does not favor limitations of
employee mobility; however, evidence suggests that litigation to enforce
noncompetes is more prevalent than ever before, and courts are more
likely than before to uphold them.151 Given the implications of a
knowledge-based economy,152 there is little surprise that courts might
favor employers’ interests to a greater extent. Further, emboldened by
their strong negotiating position, employers may draft extensive non-
compete clauses, which if reviewed in litigation, might be found unrea-
sonable by the courts. In states where “blue-penciling” contract
modification is permitted, there is no risk to the employer who over-
reaches because courts will not throw out an unreasonable noncompete,
but rather will redraft the clause to comport with what the court finds to
be reasonable.153 Where boilerplate noncompete terms are used, the
unbearably high costs of challenging the noncompete restrictions in
court and the uncertainty of the outcome of a judge’s decision might
150Id.
151Bishara, supra note 72, at 290 n.6.
152See Bishara & Orozco, supra note 51.
153See Bishara, supra note 71, at 776–77.
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have a chilling effect on any employee’s interest in fighting against the
terms or seeking alternative employment in her field.154
Regardless of when the noncompete was signed by the parties, the
enforcement of a noncompete is triggered only at the point of a decision, on
either side, to end the employment relationship. At that point, the
employee may acquiesce to the terms of the agreement without a fight or
ignore it, causing the employer to go to court to enforce the noncompete.155
The court process can be lengthy and costly for both parties, and the court’s
determination of what is reasonable in the circumstances can produce an
outcome that neither party expected. Thus, in any particular circumstance
where parties sign a noncompete agreement, the actual impact of the clause
and, therefore, what the employer and employee are consenting to would
be more and more uncertain the further removed the parties are from the
point of both contract signature and the triggering event.
The rights-based perspective may not anticipate the difficulties of the
nature of consent versus coercion, because freedom to contract is arguably
a natural right to be exercised by individuals as equals.156 In a master–
servant relationship such as that of employer–employee, the contract
transfers powers over the servant to the master, to the extent of the time
period and other terms consented to by the parties to the contract. Even
with consent, under a rights-based perspective the actual outcome may be
bounded by the party’s absolute and fundamental rights, such as Locke’s
preclusion against enslaving oneself157 and the right prioritized by
Werhane to self-development.158
154See Earthweb, Inc. v. Schlack, 71 F. Supp. 2d 299, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (noting that a
noncompete “can be a powerful weapon in the hands of an employer [as] the risk of litigation
alone may have a chilling effect on the employee”); Rachel Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap Contracts
and Worker Mobility: The Dilution of Employee Bargaining Power via Standard Form Noncompetes,
2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 963, 966–67 (“[C]ubewrap noncompetes succeed in further diluting an
employee’s already tenuous grip on any form of bargaining power. They strip away the
worker’s ability, both at the outset and during the course of employment, to refuse to deal.”);
Stewart E. Sterk, Restraints on the Alienation of Human Capital, 79 VA. L. REV. 383, 410 (1993)
(observing that “by limiting the number of attractive alternatives available to an employee, a
restrictive covenant may . . . ‘coerce’ that employee to remain with his initial employer”).
155See supra Part II.A (describing the noncompete enforcement procedures).
156See EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 119, at 20–27.
157See LOCKE, supra note 2, at 15.
158See WERHANE, supra note 128, at 18–19.
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Thus, the weaknesses of noncompetes from the rights-based perspec-
tive include (1) a failure to resolve the issues of employee consent versus
coercion to protect against employer overreaching, (2) questions about the
employee’s ability to develop herself and make a living from her property
rights in her own productive capability, and (3) a failure to gain certainty
about protection of the employer’s property rights to competitive infor-
mation such as trade secrets. Greater certainty and better protection of the
interests of both sides would be more beneficial for society. Next we will
consider a rights-based point of view on two other forms of employee-
mobility restrictions to determine whether these mechanisms better ensure
that interests in certainty and protection of property rights are available to
both employers and employees.
2. Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine
As discussed above, the inevitable disclosure doctrine results in a judicially
enforced injunction giving employers rights to restrict employee mobility
beyond the term of the employment contract.159 The doctrine provides
that “employers may enjoin a departing employee from taking a job on the
grounds that he or she will ‘inevitably disclose’ some unspecified trade
secret.”160 This doctrine is intended primarily to prevent the employee
from revealing information like a trade secret that is the property of the
employer, where revelation of that information would decrease its value
and/or impair the employer’s competitiveness.161 Accordingly, an employer
may restrict a former employee from joining a competitor if disclosure of
confidential information would be inevitable in that new employment
setting. The doctrine does not specifically have the goal of restraining the
productive capacity of the employee, although that is the ultimate effect.
Consideration of this doctrine implicates both the rights-based concerns
for protecting the employer’s property rights on the one hand and the
employee’s right to self-development on the other.
Where the employer has invested efforts in developing the informa-
tion as valued property (e.g., trade secrets) and relies upon the property
for continued competitiveness, Lockean analysis would support the
159See Hyde, supra note 23, at 6.
160Id. at 9.
161Id.
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employer’s right to protect that property from the encroachment of
others.162 Locke posits that ownership requires continued use of pro-
perty.163 Thus, when the employer’s company information related to its
competitive strategy is at issue, Lockean analysis could be used to defend
measures to protect that property.
Alternatively, because the ultimate effect of the inevitable disclosure
doctrine is to hinder the former employee’s ability to use his skills in the
type of work that may be his highest productive capacity, this doctrine
bumps up against two important rights considerations: first, the right of
individuals to protect their own self-preservation and, second, the freedom
of contract as applied to the terms of the master–servant relationship.164
Criticism of inevitable disclosure is perhaps even easier than critiques of
noncompetes because the inevitable disclosure logic allows an employer to
restrict mobility without ever bargaining or paying for the right to restrict
a knowledge transfer. As discussed above, Locke specifies that an agree-
ment to sell one’s services gives the “master” limited power only as con-
tained in the contract.165 Given that the inevitable disclosure doctrine gives
the employer powers over the employee that are not covered by an agree-
ment between them, Locke’s view of freedom to contract would be under-
mined by the employer’s ability to restrict employment opportunities
under the inevitable disclosure doctrine.166 Moreover, Locke argues for an
individual right to self-preservation, as well as an obligation on others to
respect each person’s right to self-preservation, and against any attempt to
“take away, or impair the life, or what tends to the preservation of the life,
162LOCKE, supra note 2, at 18–24.
163Id. at 24 (“[W]hatsoever he tilled and reaped, laid up and made use of, before it spoiled,
that was his peculiar right . . . . But if either the grass of his enclosure rotted on the ground,
or the fruit of his planting perished without gathering, and laying up, this part of the earth,
notwithstanding his enclosure, was still to be looked on as waste, and might be the possession
of any other.”).
164Id. at 17, 50.
165Id. at 50.
166While property rights and freedom of contract are valued in Lockean analysis, Epstein
suggests that a limited role for the state in ensuring these rights is preferable. Epstein notes,
“The unquestioned right to quit or to fire has powerful and desirable incentive effects. In
particular, it serves as an effective check against the advantage-taking open to either side in
a continuous relationship.” EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 119, at 159.
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liberty, health, limb, or goods of another.”167 The rule of inevitable disclo-
sure could potentially be used to block an employee indefinitely from work
in his chosen field, for as long as the employer’s information (e.g., trade
secrets) is protected property. Thus, to the extent the employee’s right of
self-preservation is injured by actions of the employer that step beyond the
agreed-upon terms of their relationship, a Lockean analysis would find the
doctrine of inevitable disclosure lacking.
3. Garden Leave
The concept of garden leave accomplishes many of the goals sought under
the other employee mobility constraints discussed above, without incur-
ring many of the negative impacts on the freedom of contract and the right
of self-preservation. Locke’s key concern of protecting property rights is
ensured yet appropriately limited in duration by the price mechanism.
Freedom of contract is promoted in this instance because the details of the
garden leave would be set forth in an initial employment contract to which
both parties consent. Whereas the noncompete clause provides the
employer with unilateral rights and binds the employee with duties, the
garden leave agreement generates bilateral rights and duties on the part of
both the employer and employee.168 For this reason, garden leave provides
mechanisms to protect each party’s property rights, while limiting over-
reaching on either side. The employer’s interest in protecting property
rights in competitive information is ensured, and that protection lasts only
for the period of time that the employer is willing to pay compensation (the
price mechanism). The employee preserves her interest in making a living
and protecting her rights to her productive capacity in the long run. In the
short run, although the employee would not actively use her productive
capacity in her chosen field, she would be fairly compensated for that
period. Finally, where the contract very clearly establishes the relevant
duration of garden leave, there would be a limited role of the state and a
167LOCKE, supra note 2, at 5.
168During the mandatory notice period, the garden leave agreement requires the employee
to continue employment with the employer—with all the attendant duties of loyalty—while
the employer is required to continue paying the salary and benefits due to the employee
under the contract. See, e.g., Maltby v. Harlow Meyer Savage, Inc., 633 N.Y.S.2d 926, 930
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995) (finding a garden leave provision reasonable and explicitly noting that
the payment of base salary “protects the employee’s livelihood”).
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lower level of scrutiny in adjudicating the employer–employee relation-
ship.169 From a Lockean point of view, the garden leave mechanism may be
better in preserving the bilateral rights of the individuals involved. More-
over, it is consistent with the Lockean natural rights tradition, “which
protects natural property rights and allows the state to restrict them only
as necessary to protect the property owner and his property from force
and fraud.”170
B. Utilitarian View
While a Lockean analysis focuses on individual rights with a limited role
for the state, a utilitarian perspective can be used to determine whether
employee mobility restrictions are beneficial from a public policy perspec-
tive. Utilitarian analysis typically takes an ends-based, rather than means-
based view to evaluate the morality of an outcome, with the goal of
producing the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number of
people.171 Generally, utilitarian theory applies a cost–benefit analysis not
only to the interests of individual parties but also to the overall outcomes
for society.172 Thus, to determine the ethics of mobility restrictions we
could weigh the benefit gained by employers, employees, and greater
169See Daniel J. Raker, A Lower Level of Scrutiny?: New Alternatives for an Effective Restraint on
Competitive Activity, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 751 (2008).
170James E. Macdonald & Caryn L. Beck-Dudley, A Natural Law Defense to the Employment Law
Question: A Response to Richard Epstein, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 363, 410 (2001).
171See generally JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM (Oskar Priest ed., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1957)
(1863). Mill refines and develops the philosophical proposal of Jeremy Bentham (utilitarian-
ism), which is a moral theory based on the principle that an action is morally right if its
consequences lead to happiness (absence of pain) and wrong if it ends in unhappiness (pain).
Id.
172It has been recognized that delimiting the community or population to be considered in
determining the greatest good in a utilitarian analysis is problematic. See, e.g., Gerald J.
Postema, Interests, Universal and Particular: Jeremy Bentham’s Utilitarian Theory of Value, 18
UTILITAS 109, 129 (2006) (“[S]erving particular interests is not the sort of enterprise that one
can get all the others in the community to join. It is precisely because particular interests may
point in very different directions, that the universal interest is normative for the community
taken together; any alternative will serve only some insufficiently extended sub-group, at the
expense of others.”). Further, for a consideration of whether the greatest good may be
determined in an aggregative manner or whether egalitarian distribution is possible under
utilitarian thought, see Robert Audi, Can Utilitarianism Be Distributive? Maximization and Dis-
tribution as Criteria in Managerial Decisions, 17 BUS. ETHICS Q. 593 (2007).
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society through permitting the enforcement of each type of restriction
versus the cost incurred by employers, employees, and greater society.
Where the benefits outweigh the costs, ensuring the greatest good, then
there is an ethical basis for permitting mobility restrictions under utilitar-
ian analysis.
1. Noncompetes
The costs and benefits of noncompetes to the past employer, employee,
and future employer are suggested above. Briefly, the most obvious benefit
is that it protects an employer from unfair competition in the case where
a former employee would otherwise be able to take valuable knowledge
that belongs to an employer and use it to assist a competing enterprise.
Thus, it is also important that noncompetes allow the employer to increase
the predictability of access to an important resource, in this case a human
resource.173 Accordingly, the greater certainty of staffing that comes with
an enforceable noncompete arguably encourages an employer to invest in
the employee by investing in valuable human capital.174 Another reason
why noncompetes are important to employers is that they can be used as
a shield if they incorporate antipoaching or antiraiding provisions, which
not only prohibit a former employee from competing but also stop the
employee from decimating the former employer’s workforce by hiring
away the employer’s most valuable employees.175 Nevertheless, such mea-
sures potentially constrain employees from taking their knowledge, skills,
and productive capacity to the workplace where they will be most
rewarded for utilizing them—whether this is in a competing firm or a
personal entrepreneurial venture. In effect, a noncompete may prevent
the dispersion of knowledge and its most productive use.176
173See generally Maureen B. Callahan, Comment, Post-Employment Restraint Agreements: A Reas-
sessment, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 703, 716–18 (1985) (arguing that noncompete agreements are
the employer’s only means of protecting its investment in human capital).
174See Bishara, supra note 72, at 305.
175See Anenson, supra note 87, at 2 (“In cases of employee poaching and mass defection,
employers rely on the enforceability of anticompetitive covenants to protect themselves from
such unscrupulous practices.”).
176See Bishara, supra note 72, at 306–07.
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The more difficult questions to answer related to noncompetes deal
with the costs and benefits incurred by society.177 Only legitimate busi-
ness interests are to be protected and only for a limited time and space.
The legal literature has addressed the public policy implications of non-
competes in a number of contexts, including their role in human capital
investment178 (particularly dealing with human capital in different
industries),179 in fostering or impeding the rapid transfer of technology
knowledge,180 and in top management contracts.181 Some law and eco-
nomics literature,182 as well as business economics and management lit-
erature,183 has engaged in weighing the societal costs versus benefits of
noncompetes.
This last area of scholarly work has recently seen an increase in
empirical studies measuring the impact, if any, of noncompete enforce-
ment on employee mobility,184 employee compensation and business
177Policy makers acknowledge that noncompetes are normally unenforceable as prima face
anticompetitive and against public policy. See, e.g., Reed, Roberts Assocs. v. Strauman, 353
N.E.2d 590, 592–93 (N.Y. 1976).
178See Rubin & Shedd, supra note 131.
179See Bishara, supra note 72, at 318–19.
180See Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon
Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575 (1999).
181See Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of CEO Employment
Contracts: What Do Top Executives Bargain For? 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 231, 254–57
(2006) (examining “the key legal characteristics of 375 employment contracts between
some of the largest 1500 public corporations and their chief executive officers” and finding
that about two-thirds include noncompete clauses that restrict chief executive officers’
post-employment activities from one to five years, with an average duration of two
years).
182See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & George G. Triantis, Covenants Not to Compete from an Incomplete
Contracts Perspective (Univ. of Chi. Law and Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 137, 2001),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=285805 (addressing the two objec-
tives of ex post (labor mobility) and ex ante (human capital investment) efficiency and
comparing noncompetes with the alternative contract breach remedies of specific perfor-
mance and liquidated damages).
183See, e.g., Marx et al., supra note 81 (using a natural experiment created by a change in
noncompete enforcement law to find lower rates of mobility under a policy of noncompete
enforcement).
184See Fallick et al., supra note 81; Marx et al., supra note 81.
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investment,185 and entrepreneurial activity186 in various business and juris-
dictional contexts. The results have been mixed. On the one hand, scholars
have suggested that strong enforcement of noncompetes is good for the
public interest because it leads to increased employer investment in human
capital, which benefits society by leading to a better trained workforce.187
On the other hand, Alan Hyde has recently interpreted new empirical
research on noncompetes to suggest that the economic harm to the restric-
tion of labor mobility and knowledge transfer outweighs any benefits,
concluding that all noncompetes should be banned, as in California.188
Moreover, because of asymmetries in the negotiating position between
powerful employers and individual employees, there may be a tendency
for employers to overreach in their noncompete terms.189
In addition, noncompetes are criticized simply for their anticompeti-
tive nature.190 This is perhaps connected to concerns that noncompetes
may cause economic harm via inefficient allocation of resources because
these contracts restrict the free and rapid flow of labor. In other words, the
criticism is that noncompetes allow one party to unfairly shift the burden
of transaction costs related to restrictions to the weaker party, in this case
the individual employee who is less able to bear the costs of compliance
with the contract. In addition, some commentators perceive that “[t]he
heightened scrutiny of employee noncompete agreements reflects some of
the fundamental changes taking place in the economy and in the work-
place.”191 Specifically, noncompetes are problematic in the context of “the
changing nature of the employment relationship, particularly the move-
ment away from the traditional long-term employment relationship typical
in the industrial age . . . [and] the benefits of information sharing and
employee mobility in the information age economy.”192
185Garmaise, supra note 33.
186Stuart & Sorenson, supra note 81.
187Posner & Triantis, supra note 182.
188Hyde, supra note 23, at 10–11.
189See, e.g., Stone, supra note 141, at 740.
190See Bishara, supra note 72.
191Garrison & Wendt, supra note 4, at 164.
192Id. at 165.
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In summary, states that allow employee noncompetes are, in effect,
recognizing a public policy in favor of tempering free competition and
mobility, to varying degrees, by allowing parties to contract for certain
restrictions. Even if a noncompete will lessen otherwise lawful competition,
and potentially inhibit the flow of knowledge, today most states will allow
this compromise. However, the employer’s extension of contractual
control over a competitive human resource comes with potential harm for
individual employees who may disproportionately bear the costs of pro-
tecting an employer’s proprietary information, as well as potentially
impeding the development of entrepreneurial competitive ventures.
2. Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine
The inevitable disclosure doctrine provides that “employers may enjoin a
departing employee from taking a job on the grounds that he or she will
‘inevitably disclose’ some unspecified trade secret.”193 Accordingly, an
employer may restrict a former employee from joining a competitor if
disclosure of confidential information would be inevitable in that new
employment setting. Because it is not a contract-based remedy, an
employer seeking inevitable disclosure protection essentially argues for a
default rule to protect her intellectual property as captured in a trade
secret. In effect, the employer is asking for a court to determine that a
former employee will eventually, even unconsciously, divulge or otherwise
use the trade secret in competition. As a result, the remedy is a prohibition
on the former employee going to work for a competitor where it is
assumed that the trade secret will surely be used sooner or later.
The problems with the doctrine from a utilitarian point of view are
similar to the issues mentioned above with noncompete clauses. In fact,
critiquing inevitable disclosure is more straightforward than a critique of
noncompetes because the inevitable disclosure doctrine empowers an
employer to restrict the employee’s mobility when the employer did not
even bargain for the restriction.194 The successful employer receives pro-
193Hyde, supra note 23, at 9.
194See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 48, at 404 (“[C]ourts that grant injunctions in inevitable disclosure
cases are in essence creating judicially crafted covenants not to compete. This runs contrary to the
most fundamental principles of employment and contract law, as a contract term—one extremely
harmful to the employee and quite beneficial to the employer—is forced upon the two parties in
the absence of a bargained-for- agreement.” (footnote omitted)).
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tection from competition indefinitely while the employee’s ability to con-
tribute to society by using knowledge and developing skills is limited.195
Thus the employer reaps all the benefits, while the employee and, indeed,
society bear the costs. In addition, the inevitable disclosure doctrine con-
strains competition and may decrease knowledge diffusion that leads to
subsequent innovation.
Perhaps worse, the implication is that the restriction on mobility is
not bounded in time and scope like a noncompete term, which is subject to
a reasonableness test. To the contrary, the information that is the subject of
the trade secret in an inevitable disclosure action will be protectable—and
thus so too the grounds to prevent the employee from moving freely—as
long as the information remains a bona fide trade secret.196 This could lead
not only to a temporary restraining order, causing a break in the employ-
ee’s career, but also potentially to a permanent restraining order providing
that the employee could not go to work for a certain company for a
specified time.197 Moreover, this mechanism is obtained by burdening
judicial resources and placing extra costs on both parties and on society.
The employee is not paid for this required limitation in career opportu-
nities and, because this is a judicially granted mechanism, the employee
and the employer, as well as the judicial system, must endure the time and
expense of litigation.
It seems as though the inevitable disclosure method is an attempt to
put the champagne cork back in the bottle, a desperate attempt for the
employer to protect assets when it neither adequately considered the need
for protection ahead of time, nor engaged in adequate dialogue with the
employee to resolve the issue to everyone’s satisfaction. Proponents of
using inevitable disclosure to restrict employee mobility assert that,
because it is solely judicially administered, there is assurance that the
protection will be granted only in legitimate, reasonable, and limited
cases.198 However, from a public policy standpoint, the contrary argument
could be made. The costs and benefits of this mechanism seem stacked in
195See Stone, supra note 141, at 740.
196Id.
197Id.
198Garrison & Wendt, supra note 4, at 178–85.
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favor of the employer to the detriment of the employee’s interests in
benefiting from the use of her skills and knowledge, as well as society’s
interests as a whole in benefiting from an economy based on healthy
competition and the diffusion of knowledge that can lead to innovation. If
it became the standard mechanism to require judicial intervention to
resolve termination of employment when trade secrets are at issue, it could
place an enormous burden on judicial resources, without creating a net
benefit for society as a whole.199 One would hope this doctrine would be
used only very rarely and cautiously when there are no other options to
protect legitimate proprietary business information. It would be prefer-
able for the primary mechanism used to resolve these disputes to be one
that encourages the parties to negotiate a mutually satisfactory resolution
within appropriate limits that does not unduly burden the greater interests
of society. This might be the strength of the garden leave mechanism,
discussed next.
3. Garden Leave
Garden leave is like a noncompete in that it protects an employer’s interest
in information by prohibiting mobility, but it has the extra advantage of
forcing the employer to bear those costs post-employment, which compen-
sates the employee.200 From a legal and economic perspective, Cynthia
Estlund has pointed out that with garden leave an
employer gets the same protection as a similar period of “non-competition,”
[as with a noncompete] but must bear the primary economic burden itself
rather than casting it on the employee. Employees’ postemployment activities
199See William Lynch Schaller, Secrets of the Trade: Tactical and Legal Considerations from the Trade
Secret Plaintiff ’s Perspective, 29 REV. LITIG. 729, 809–10 (2010) (“The very point of injunctive
relief is to prevent injury and damages by preemptive court intervention—in effect, remedium
absque injuria: a remedy without injury. Trade secret inevitable disclosure claims are, in fact,
classic examples of this principle.” (citations omitted)); William Lynch Schaller, Trade Secret
Inevitable Disclosure: Substantive, Procedural & Practical Implications of an Evolving Doctrine (Part
I), 86 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 336, 341–43 (2004) (reviewing the cost implications of
numerous trade secret cases).
200See Raker, supra note 169, at 752 (finding that “recent decisions suggest that courts are
more likely to enforce a restriction provision where the company alleviates the effect of the
former employee’s ‘loss of livelihood’ by paying the former employee during the non-
compete period”).
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are still restricted; some opportunities may dry up and some employee knowl-
edge may grow stale during the period of enforced idleness.201
However, she also observes that “the garden leave device has the virtue of
forcing employers to internalize the primary cost of restrictions on
employees’ post-employment activities, and thus to think twice about
whether and how long they are willing to do so.”202 Put another way, the
obvious cost of paying an employee not to work inserts the discipline of
the price mechanism into the employer’s decision making, which provides
the employer with an incentive to pay to restrict the mobility only of highly
valuable employees and to do so for the shortest length of time that will
protect valuable knowledge from being transferred immediately.
Even though there are benefits associated with garden leave over
noncompetes or inevitable disclosure, there are also drawbacks. The
garden leave clause seems less amendable to reasonableness scrutiny by
policy makers and may still act as an improper restraint on trade. It may
also allow employer overreaching, provided that the employer is willing to
pay to overreach.203 It is still restrictive from a public policy perspective, in
that the public is denied the beneficial services, innovation, and knowledge
of the worker for a period of time. The worker is not being a productive
member of society—even if she is not being denied compensation to
refrain from competition. Moreover, though the worker is getting paid to
lock up her skills, she is potentially harmed by not having her skills remain
sharp and relevant.204 Shareholders also may complain that the firm is
paying someone not to work and receiving no tangible value in return.
There are business issues with that type of waste. Nonetheless, this cost is
arguably a good investment because it reduces the otherwise likely transfer
of time-sensitive knowledge, skills, and relationships to a competitor.
Finally, garden leave is fundamentally an anticompetitive mechanism that
could lead to abuse, albeit perhaps less than the other two.
201Estlund, supra note 107, at 425.
202Id.
203Hepple, supra note 108, at 214–15.
204Id. (“The courts have recently become concerned about the possible abuse of garden leave.
They have declined to grant injunctions unless there is an express clause prohibiting work for
a rival during the notice period, and have been willing to imply an obligation on the employer
to provide work during the notice period, particularly if the employee requires work to
maintain skills and experience.”).
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C. Fairness Analysis
Rawls’s ethical theory centers on justice and fairness in the design and
evaluation of social institutions.205 Scholars holding the traditional narrow
view of the applicability of Rawls’s “basic structure” of society generally
reserve Rawlsian analysis for public law issues such as basic constitutional
liberties and systems of tax and transfer, rather than private law issues such
as provisions of employment contract law.206 In this view, contracts are seen
as a private outcome of promises made between specific parties, where
there is little role for an analysis of overall social fairness. However, Rawls’s
own writings are ambiguous as to which social institutions are appropri-
ately evaluated in terms of fairness in the basic structure.207 A broader view
asserts that Rawlsian analysis of justice as fairness can legitimately be
applied to systems of private law such as the body of laws governing
contracts.208 In a Rawlsian analysis, “contract law would be constructed
such that, when viewed in conjunction with all other legal and political
institutions, it best serves the demands of the principles of justice.”209 For
purposes of this discussion, we will take the broader view and use a
simplified Rawlsian analysis to explore restrictions on employee mobility
as part of the social institution of employment law.
To consider the fairness of various legal institutions controlling the
mobility of employees—including contractual noncompete clauses, the
inevitable disclosure doctrine, and garden leave—we engage in a Rawlsian
thought experiment. Thus we imagine ourselves in the “original position”
behind a “veil of ignorance,”210 not knowing whether we would be an
employer seeking to protect business assets from unfair competition, an
employee seeking to preserve her freedom of movement, or a startup firm
205JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT (Erin Kelly ed., 2001).
206See generally Kevin A. Kordana & David H. Tabachnick, Rawls and Contract Law, 73 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 598 (2004) (expanding the conventional Rawlsian view of private law).
207Id. at 604–05 (citing THOMAS W. POGGE, REALIZING RAWLS 21–23 (1989)); id. at 604 n.26
(quoting POGGE, supra (“Rawls leaves this notion [of the basic structure] not merely vague but
also ambiguous.”)).
208Id. at 624–25 (concluding that a democratically elected legislature is charged with enacting
legislation that is just and fair, according to a Rawlsian basic structure).
209Kordana & Tabachnick, supra note 206, at 623.
210RAWLS, supra note 205, at 42.
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looking to hire experienced staff. The parties would not know what type of
business assets would require protection, nor the nature of the competitive
market. Moreover, the parties would not know the skill level of the
employee, the nature of the labor market, or the relative bargaining power
of employer and employee.
In this thought experiment, we seek to establish a social order with
impartial and rational principles, including the liberty principle, which
assumes that all persons are free and equal,211 and the difference principle,
which permits social and economic inequalities as long as the least advan-
taged members of society are benefited.212 The difference principle would
not be applied on a transaction-by-transaction basis, rather the idea is to
establish “a set of rules that, when applied generally, is instrumental to the
overall scheme of legal and political institutions that maximizes the posi-
tion of the least well-off, as compared to other possible schemes.”213 From
behind the veil of ignorance, we want to determine reasonable mecha-
nisms for employers to protect valuable firm assets, such as strategic
knowledge and information from unfair competition, which would also
protect an employee’s ability to sell her labor services in an open market
where they would be utilized at their highest value. From a societal per-
spective we might want to balance the growth and innovation benefits of a
high-velocity labor market214 with a degree of stability and certainty in
outcomes.215
1. Noncompetes
As noncompete agreements are contractual clauses that can be negotiated
between the parties, they could be ideal for protecting the interests of
211Id.
212Id.
213Kordana & Tabachnick, supra note 206, at 626.
214Hyde, supra note 23, at 6–11.
215See generally Richard Nielsen, High-Leverage Finance Capitalism, the Economic Crisis, Structur-
ally Related Ethics Issues, and Potential Reforms, 20 BUS. ETHICS Q. 299, 325–26 (2010) (suggest-
ing that society is better off when rapid change from evolutionary forms of capitalism is
balanced with social controls and that in this way “we may be able to realize Schumpeter’s
vision of ‘creative destruction’ with less destruction and social inequality as well as Aristotle’s
ideal of creating wealth in such a way as to make us better people and the world a better
place”).
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employers while preserving the rights of employees. But, as applied,
noncompete clauses are often unilateral mechanisms that force employees
to bear the primary burden and that allocate the benefit to established
employers. Because the burden of the noncompete is externalized by the
employer onto the employee, employers have an incentive to overreach.
Thus, in the original position from behind a veil of ignorance, the question
arises whether the interests of the most vulnerable populations are pro-
tected by this practice. Differences in bargaining power lead to employees
signing noncompete clauses that are detrimental to their interests simply
because they have limited alternate options.216 This concern is underlined
by instances of noncompete agreements being enforced against involun-
tarily terminated or low-skilled employees who have few opportunities for
alternative employment.217
The effort by some state legislatures to narrow the applicability of
noncompetes to only skilled, high-earning employees is one potential
solution, as these individuals are more likely than low-earning employees
actually to have access to business information worthy of protection.218
This solution might be fairer to employees; however, it could potentially
increase the anticompetitive impact on society precisely because skilled
employees are most likely to innovate and create startup enterprises.
Finally, one negative point for employers is the uncertainty involved in
whether proprietary business information will actually be protected
because employers are dependent on the courts to enforce noncompetes
when employees resist them. Because of these issues, under a Rawlsian
analysis, it seems clear that use of noncompete clauses to protect competi-
tive business information would not be the fairest mechanism to any of the
parties, particularly to the most vulnerable.
216For a discussion of these issues, see supra notes 130–32 and accompanying text.
217See generally Kenneth J. Vanko, “You’re Fired! And Don’t Forget Your Non-Compete . . .”: The
Enforceability of Restrictive Covenants in Involuntary Discharge Cases, 1 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J.
1 (2002) (examining covenants not to compete in the context of an involuntary termination
and concluding that courts should employ a balancing of the equities approach to give
consideration to the nature of the discharge in conjunction with all other relevant factors).
218See COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-113(2) (2010) (limiting enforcement of employee noncompete
covenants to “[e]xecutive and management personnel[,] and officers and employees who
constitute professional staff to executive and management personnel”). Interestingly, the
proposed noncompete reform legislation in Massachusetts sets a specific employee salary
floor of $125,000 for noncompete enforcement. See Brownsberger, supra note 77.
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2. Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine
In some ways, this doctrine raises even more concerns than noncompetes
related to fairness because it does not require prior notice to or the consent
of the employee. Nevertheless, some commentators find the inevitable
disclosure doctrine superior to noncompetes.219 The upside of this doc-
trine is that it is crafted and enforced by judges who can carefully tailor the
application of the doctrine to protect specific business information, while
allegedly ensuring against overreaching, which can have a chilling effect
on an employee’s mobility.220 Thus this doctrine may be more balanced
and equitable, with judges assuring the protection of the interests of the
most vulnerable.
However, there are several downsides of the inevitable disclosure
doctrine. First of all, justice for employers is uncertain as they will not
know whether their competitive information will be protected until the
resolution of the process. This mechanism is even more dependent on
judicial enforcement than noncompetes. For employees who are pre-
cluded from employment options as a result of the application of this
doctrine, fairness of the outcome may be questionable as the remedy is
often not temporary, but rather a permanent injunction. As the new
psychological employment contract more frequently asks employees to
provide for their own futures and bear the risks of economic cycles,221 the
burden of limited employment options might fall quite heavily on an
employee. Thus, looking at the inevitable disclosure doctrine as a social
system of employment law, Rawls might find it to fall short in the appli-
cation of the difference principle. The social and economic inequalities
inherent in this mechanism do not tend to maximize the position of the
least-advantaged members of society.
219See Garrison & Wendt, supra note 4, at 186 (proposing that trade secret protection should
be decoupled from employee noncompete law, no longer being considered a legitimate
justification for an employee noncompete agreement). According to Garrison and Wendt,
“Trade secrets would continue to be protected from actual or threatened misappropriation
under confidentiality agreements and trade secret laws. Most importantly, courts would be
empowered to prevent employment of a former employee under the inevitable disclosure
doctrine.” Id.
220Id. at 160.
221Katherine V.W. Stone, Legal Regulation of the Changing [Employment] Contract, 13 CORNELL J.
L. & PUB. POL’Y 563, 570–71 (2004).
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3. Garden Leave
Given that the foundation of a Rawlsian analysis is to find a solution for the
structure of society that all parties can agree upon regardless of their
position in society, there are many reasons why garden leave might be
preferable to the others. There are several benefits of garden leave. First,
it is neither unilateral nor court determined, but rather a negotiated
agreement, where the benefits and burdens are shared by the employer
and employee. While the employer receives protection of proprietary
business information for the agreed amount of time, the employee is
compensated for the lack of livelihood during that period. The burden is
not externalized by the employer (as with noncompetes), but a cost for
exercising this mechanism—the cost of the continued salary of the
employee—is borne directly by the employer rather than some state-based
unemployment insurance.222 Thus, the party that is usually more vulner-
able is afforded greater protection in this case than in any other type of
mobility restriction because the employee’s livelihood during the relevant
period is ensured as part of the mechanism. As a result, an employer has
an incentive to tailor and limit the garden leave to only the amount of time
that is relevant to the specific position and business knowledge gained by
the employee.
When it comes to social impacts, garden leave, like noncompetes and
inevitable disclosure, has negative social impacts related to restraints on
innovation as a result of limited labor mobility and knowledge transfer.
However, with this mechanism it remains possible for the employer to
protect resources that it values. Because garden leave involves a negotiated
solution that shares costs and benefits between the parties, Rawls’s liberty
principle supporting the freedom and equality of all parties is upheld. For
these reasons, while there are still weaknesses, a Rawlsian analysis of
employment mobility mechanisms is likely to favor garden leave over other
options.
D. Comparison of Mechanisms
We have identified various strengths and weakness of the three mecha-
nisms for restricting employee mobility from the perspectives of rights,
utilitarian, and fairness ethical reasoning. These perspectives give a fuller
222See Lembrich, supra note 103, at 2317–18.
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consideration of the three elements of the reasonableness test applied by
courts for the enforcement of noncompete clauses.
Two questions remain to be discussed in this article. First, in com-
paring the analyses of the three mechanisms, while each has shortcomings,
is there one mechanism that should be promoted more than the others
from a public policy perspective? In other words, on the individual level,
which mechanism should an ethical manager choose to use? Second, what
improvements can be suggested in the application of each of these mecha-
nisms to counter the problems identified herein? We will wrap up this
section on the ethics critique of restrictions on employee mobility by
discussing which is the preferable mechanism. Then, we will address the
second question in our recommendations in Part IV.
In our assessment, garden leave, which seems to be relatively new to
the United States, generally provides an improvement over the existing
structure of judicial enforcement of noncompete clauses or the inevitable
disclosure doctrine. The main weaknesses of the garden leave doctrine are
the required idleness on the employee’s part that likely results in a loss of
productivity to the detriment of corporate shareholders and society
overall, as well as the employee’s potential loss of skill sharpness. Never-
theless, from a rights perspective, garden leave seems best to protect the
fundamental rights and legitimate interests of both employers and
employees. Employers can preserve their property rights to proprietary
information. Employees preserve their freedom to exercise and develop
their productive capacity. The recognition of rights and obligations of both
parties is inherent in the garden leave mechanism and may serve to
promote a basis for mutually agreeable compromise, finding a way to
protect the important rights of both parties.
From a utilitarian perspective, by protecting the employer’s propri-
etary information only to the extent that the employer is willing to pay the
employee to remain idle, the price mechanism inherent in a garden leave
provision provides a way to optimize the cost-benefit analysis. This has the
benefit of providing the specific degree of security that the employer
requires to continue to invest in knowledge development. As a result, the
long-run social cost is lessened when the employee is more quickly able to
deploy to her desired position, though there is a temporary decrease in
productivity during the leave period. Moreover, garden leave also limits
the restriction on competition and knowledge diffusion within society to a
temporary period, as well as reduces the costs of using scarce judicial
resources. From a utilitarian perspective, garden leave may provide
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greater benefits to the employer, the employee, and to society as a whole,
while limiting the costs borne by each party. Thus, garden leave provides
for a greater good relative to the other two types of mobility restrictions.
Finally, from a Rawlsian perspective, garden leave is the mechanism
most likely to create a social order that ensures equality while protecting
the interests of the most vulnerable. The burden of protecting the employ-
er’s interest in proprietary information is shared by both parties rather
than wholly externalized by the employer because the employer pays the
employee for the agreed upon period of idleness during which the
employee agrees not to use or develop her skills on behalf of a competitor.
This structure of private contract law may result in a more just social order
than either of the other two mechanisms.
From a business ethics perspective, while garden leave also has its
flaws, it may be most preferable for policy makers, employee interest
groups, and managers to encourage the use of garden leave policies. While
we provide more specific recommendations below relative to limiting the
weaknesses inherent to each of the three employee mobility restriction
mechanisms, overall, we assert that legislatures considering regulations on
employee mobility restrictions and drafters of the Restatement of Employment
Law may wish to consider encouraging garden leave as the preferable
mechanism for protecting the interests of both parties and society as a
whole. Further, managers seeking to implement ethical business practices
may favor garden leave policies above other types of mobility restrictions.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLICY MAKERS
We have reviewed three mechanisms for restraining employee mobility
and protecting employer proprietary information and scrutinized each
using various business ethics frameworks. First, we examined these mecha-
nisms from a property rights-based view, which emphasizes the employer’s
right to protect its business assets and the employee’s right of control over
her labor. Second, we applied a utilitarian account of the costs and benefits
to employers, employees, and society of the three mechanisms. Finally, we
applied a Rawlsian perspective to analyze the equity and fairness of each
mechanism, with an eye on reducing the negative impact on the most
vulnerable individuals in the employment relationship.
Our analysis shows that each mechanism is problematic in its own
way. Accordingly, a court or state legislature wishing to advance any of the
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ideals (achieving fairness, maximizing social benefits, or protecting prop-
erty rights) needs to recognize the shortcomings of each. In this section, we
offer recommendations to policy makers to overcome some of the short-
comings inherent in each of the employee mobility restraint mechanisms,
while still recognizing the importance of protecting proprietary business
information. In general, we suggest that it would be most desirable for all
persons concerned (except perhaps litigators who specialize in employ-
ment termination lawsuits) if the preferred mechanism protecting business
proprietary information would prioritize open communication, mutual
understanding, and negotiation between employers and employees rather
than unilateral or judicially imposed obligations.
The noncompete mechanism seems to inadequately protect individu-
als’ rights, because of the bargaining asymmetries inherent in the inception
of the agreement. Noncompete enforcement is also subject to abuse by
employers who are generally in a more powerful bargaining position. For
instance, the employer can use the mere threat of litigation over a non-
compete to chill the employee’s desire to move to a competitor or to start
a competing enterprise.223 Post-employment enforcement also leaves the
employee uncompensated by the employer and unable to earn a living
working in her preferred position.224 Essentially, the employer has little
cost incentive not to overreach and try to enforce the greatest restriction
on mobility possible, at the expense of the employee’s property rights.
Noncompete policy can be changed to remedy these issues and better
achieve ethical ideals. For example, limiting the level of employee who may
be subject to noncompetes might help address property rights concerns.
In addition, specific rules limiting the types of business information that
may be covered by a noncompete may better ensure that the benefits
employers gain by enforcement of noncompetes outweigh the social costs
of constrained competition. Finally, the process by which noncompetes are
established may be reformed to better achieve fair and equitable outcomes.
All states that permit noncompetes should limit their applicability
solely to employees who are most likely to have possession of proprietary
business information that is sufficiently valuable to require protection. For
223See DiMatteo, supra note 54, at 765 (discussing the potentially coercive use of noncompetes
by employers). Professor DiMatteo argues that employee noncompetes have “two strategic
purposes: proprietary protection and strategic coercion,” with “[t]he second purpose
seek[ing] to deter employee movement to a competitor.” Id.
224See Stone, supra note 141, at 742.
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instance, proposals in Massachusetts and Illinois seek to limit the type of
employees who may be covered by a noncompete to highly compensated
and business-crucial employees.225 In addition, for over three decades,
Colorado’s noncompete statute has limited noncompete enforcement to
“[e]xecutive and management personnel[,] and officers and employees
who constitute professional staff to executive and management person-
nel.”226 For other jurisdictions interested in limiting the coverage of non-
competes to employees whose mobility to a competitor may be cause for
legitimate concern, this coverage could be determined, for example, by
setting a limitation based on the employee’s rank, salary, or expertise.
Along this line of thinking, the type of business information that is pro-
tected by noncompetes should be limited to truly proprietary information
that is strategically relevant to the firm’s competitive competency.
Finally, the process of entering into a noncompete agreement should
be regulated to ensure that there is no question that employees fully
consent to the noncompete clause. At the outset, when the parties are
negotiating all the relevant aspects of the job or of a promotion, such as
salary and duties, the employer should be required to disclose the terms
that will be required of the employee. Arnow-Richman suggests courts
could accomplish this if they simply refused jurisdiction over noncompete
agreements that were not signed as part of the primary negotiation for the
job.227 While noncompetes can be an important mechanism to protect
business proprietary information, limiting them in these ways would cut
down on litigation.
The doctrine of inevitable disclosure is perhaps even more antitheti-
cal to an employee-rights or fairness-based ethical perspective. Specifically,
the doctrine restricts the post-employment mobility of the employee as
does the noncompete, but it does so without clearly defined temporal
parameters. The theory is that the trade secret in the employee’s posses-
sion is always at risk of disclosure if the employee works for a competitor.
The doctrine can arise in the absence of a noncompete or any other
225See supra notes 77–78.
226See COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-113(2) (2010).
227Arnow-Richman, supra note 137, at 657 (calling for disclosure in employment contracts
comparable to that called for in consumer protection law such that “[e]ither through common
law or statutory initiative, any term withheld until after the employee’s acceptance of the
initial offer would be unenforceable if the term could have been provided as part of the hiring
process”).
58 Vol. 49 / American Business Law Journal
contractual agreement. Thus, on its own, an imposition of an inevitable
disclosure-based injunction prohibits an employee’s mobility, requiring
neither the employee to consent to the restriction nor the employer to
negotiate or pay for it. As a result, the employee cannot work for a
competitor—perhaps indefinitely—yet never accepted the restriction nor
received compensation for it. The balance clearly shifts to the employer at
the expense of the employee’s property rights.
The doctrine of inevitable disclosure is also antithetical to the idea of
maximizing social benefit. In terms of the potential benefits to society, this
mechanism does not reward businesses that act with foresight to protect
business secrets and seek common ground with employees. Rather it
rewards firms that have no other way to protect valuable trade secrets. In
terms of costs to society, the fact that this doctrine is solely judicially
enforced means that if it became a universal practice, significant judicial
resources could be tied up in this mechanism (making employment litiga-
tors the most satisfied beneficiaries).
To improve this mechanism in a manner to better achieve ethical
ideals, the application of the doctrine of inevitable disclosure should be
limited. Specifically, courts could ensure greater fairness and equity in the
judicial process when applying the inevitable disclosure doctrine by limit-
ing who could be subject to the doctrine (to better protect property rights)
and specifying what subject matter it can cover (to maximize benefits while
minimizing social costs). As with noncompetes, only high-level employees
who are proven to have possession of high-level proprietary business
information should be subject to such injunctions. Further, the employer
should have to establish that the information actually possessed by the
employee is sufficiently valuable to require protection. In other words, it
should cover only truly proprietary information that is strategically rel-
evant to the firm’s competitive position and core competency. Finally, in
terms of process, before a judge can impose an injunction, there should be
some evidentiary requirement establishing that the employer has already
met a very high standard for enacting measures to protect its business
proprietary information. Such measures could include things such as
regularly requiring employees to sign confidentiality agreements; seeking
and defending legal intellectual property protection for any business infor-
mation, processes, and knowledge that are subject to federal patent, trade-
mark, copyright, and trade secret rules; and limiting which employees
have access to full knowledge about key proprietary business processes,
secret recipes, and client lists. In order to conserve rare judicial resources,
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the burden of proof to obtain an injunction based on the doctrine of
inevitable disclosure must be sufficiently high to establish that all other
mechanisms to protect business information have been attempted and this
really is the last resort.
Of the three mechanisms, garden leave seems to be on better ethical
grounds in terms of the fairness and equity provided to the departing
employee. With garden leave the employer internalizes the cost of enforc-
ing a restriction on employee mobility. Thus, the price mechanism ensures
that the potential power-abusing party (the employer) will restrict only
behavior that it thinks is truly worth purchasing and creates an incentive
to limit the period of mobility prohibition. When the employer willingly, if
begrudgingly, bears those costs after the employee leaves, it becomes
clearer that removing the employee from the labor market has tangible
costs. With garden leave the employer will more likely accurately value the
true costs of restricting mobility and have an economic incentive to refrain
from overreaching or any vindictive behavior. As compared to the blunt-
ness of a noncompete for restricting unfair competition, garden leave may
actually sharpen the focus on the issues related to competitiveness and
specific employees’ financial value to a firm.
Thus, with garden leave there is an ethically sound balance struck
between the individual rights of the employee to restrict the sale of her
labor and the employer’s protectable interest in curtailing unfair compe-
tition. The Lockean concern about abuse of the employee’s property rights
is alleviated because garden leave creates a market for the employee’s
services, values them accordingly, and compensates the employee. Like the
noncompete negotiation, but now with a market valuation component, the
employee retains some power to sell her labor (i.e., choose to work for a
competitor) but does so on more balanced terms. Moreover, the incentives
align for the employer not to overreach, because it is forced to pay for any
immobility it “purchases” during the garden leave period. For these
reasons, the concerns about which employees and what information the
garden leave captures and restricts appear to become less dire. Just as with
noncompetes the employer should disclose the terms that will be required
of the employee at the outset, when the parties are negotiating all the
relevant aspects of the initial employment or subsequent promotion such
as salary and duties, in order to ensure there is no question that an
employee fully consents to a garden leave clause. In addition, the garden
leave clause could include a mediation requirement in the event of dis-
agreement about its application, which would ensure that open commu-
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nication, mutual understanding, and negotiation between employers
and employees would be prioritized over unilateral or judicially imposed
obligations.
CONCLUSION
Legislatures and judges have sought to find the socially optimal balance of
the tensions between the desire for freedom of employee mobility and the
need to protect business information that creates competitive advantage.
Nationwide, legal decisions run the gamut in terms of regulations and
rulings permitting or prohibiting employee mobility restraint mechanisms
such as noncompetes, the doctrine of inevitable disclosure, and garden
leave. While these legal opinions or legislative developments may refer
generally to concepts such as property rights, utilitarian analyses, and
fairness, we hope that this review of the ethical and philosophical bases for
these concepts might provide a much-needed context to support policy
development.
Moreover, this analysis helps to address a gap in the literature on the
evaluation of ethical issues related to employee mobility restraints. The
discussion above may inform the debate on the appropriateness and legiti-
mate scope of these measures. This analysis may support future research-
ers not only in their work with these specific legal mechanisms but also
perhaps more broadly in evaluating property rights, balancing costs and
benefits, and determining fairness in the context of a knowledge-based
economy.
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